Maidstone Borough Council v Langley Frank Beck & Ors

Contempt for breach of an injunction requires proof, to the criminal standard, of a clear breach which was within the defendant’s power to avoid. The applicant bears the burden throughout. A psychiatric disorder may prevent contempt only where it made compliance impossible, rather than merely difficult or undesirable. The relevant mental element is an intention to perform the act or omission, together with knowledge of the facts making it a breach; an intention to disobey the order itself is unnecessary. The court must identify precisely what the defendant failed to do and find that compliance was possible. A defendant’s motivation, resentment or preference for continuing an unlawful way of life does not establish impossibility.

Maidstone Borough Council, the local planning authority, applied to commit Mr Beck for breaches of an injunction made on 1 April 2021 concerning unauthorised uses and conditions on land at Cotton Tree. Mr Beck admitted breaches involving residential occupation, spreading waste, laying and removing hardstanding, and removing vehicles, portacabins and other materials.

He relied on psychiatric evidence concerning hoarding disorder, schizotypal disorder and adjustment disorder. One psychiatrist considered compliance without assistance near impossible; another considered that Mr Beck retained the ability to comply. The central issue was whether his psychiatric conditions made compliance impossible so that the admitted breaches did not amount to contempt.

1. Contempt established. The court found to the criminal standard that Mr Beck had been able to comply with the injunction and had not been prevented from doing so by his psychiatric conditions. He was therefore in contempt of court in respect of the admitted breaches.
2. The governing principles, drawn principally from Melanie Olu-Williams v Oscar Olu-Williams, required the court to construe the order precisely, identify the acts or omissions constituting breach, and determine whether compliance was within the defendant’s power. The burden remained on the applicant, and the court had to be sure both of the breach and of the ability to comply.
3. A psychiatric disorder could in principle be an impediment to compliance if it made compliance impossible. The evidence did not establish that here. Mr Beck’s own witness statement recorded steps already taken and intended to be taken to clear the land, which was inconsistent with his being deprived of ordinary agency. Much of the material resulted from economic activities and was retained for its perceived financial value, rather than because of a psychological inability to discard it.
4. The psychiatric conditions did not plausibly explain breaches involving prohibitions on residence, allowing another person to reside on the land, spreading waste or laying hardstanding. Those matters reflected rational choices connected with use of the land for living or earning a livelihood. Resentment towards the authority and rigid or unusual beliefs did not amount to inability to comply.
5. The committal hearing was adjourned for disclosure of Mr Beck’s financial position and consideration of sanction. The court deferred imposing a penalty to allow him to purge his contempt; future compliance would materially affect sentence.

First-instance decision. The judgment records no appeal or earlier judicial decision determining the present committal application.