Mohammad Adil v General Medical Council

Professional disciplinary action affecting freedom of expression must satisfy the prescribed by law requirement under article 10. The statutory framework may require interpretation alongside professional standards and guidance to provide sufficient accessibility and foreseeability.

A doctor who uses medical credentials to promote views on matters of medical importance remains within the professional sphere, even when speaking online and outside clinical work. The expression of an unusual medical opinion is not, by itself, misconduct. Clear justification is required, such as evidence of harm to patients or public health. However, objectively unsupported conspiracy claims presented through professional credentials may justify disciplinary action to protect public health and confidence in the profession. Specific evidence of diminished public confidence is not essential where an expert tribunal can assess that issue objectively.

The applicant, a locum consultant colorectal surgeon, appealed under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 against Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal decisions finding misconduct and impairment of fitness to practise arising from YouTube videos concerning Covid-19, and imposing six months’ suspension together with an immediate suspension order.

The appeal challenged the legality and proportionality of the interference with article 10 rights. The applicant argued that the applicable professional standards were insufficiently foreseeable, that the Tribunal had wrongly relied on views being contrary to widely accepted medical opinion, that there was no evidential basis for its public-confidence conclusion, and that the sanctions were disproportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal’s findings of misconduct and impairment, six-month suspension and immediate suspension order were lawful and proportionate.
2. The statutory provisions of the Medical Act 1983, considered alone, did not provide sufficient foreseeability for the purposes of article 10. They authorised the GMC to set professional standards and impose sanctions, but did not explain in sufficient detail how doctors were expected to conduct themselves. The Act had to be read with Good Medical Practice and the GMC’s Social Media Guidance. Paragraph 65 of Good Medical Practice, together with the guidance on public social media, sufficiently identified the relevant obligation to maintain public trust. The failure to cite those materials expressly in the charge sheet was not material on the facts.
3. On a section 40 appeal, which proceeds by way of rehearing, the High Court must apply article 10 for itself. However, appropriate weight must be given to the specialist Tribunal’s assessment of matters within its professional expertise. Maintaining the good standing of the medical profession is a legitimate objective under article 10(2).
4. The applicant’s remarks engaged professional responsibilities because he presented himself as a doctor and relied on his medical credentials. The fact that the videos were made outside work and did not concern treatment of a particular patient did not remove them from the professional sphere.
5. The expression of an opinion outside widely accepted medical opinion is not, without more, a sufficient basis for discipline. Legitimate disagreement and discussion of medical hypotheses may be protected by article 10. In this case, however, the Tribunal was entitled to regard claims that the virus did not exist and that vaccines formed part of conspiracies for population control as qualitatively different from legitimate medical disagreement. The conclusions on misconduct, impairment and sanction were therefore proportionate.
6. An expert professional tribunal applying the objective standard of public confidence may assess the likely effect of conduct without specific evidence from members of the public. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the statements, presented through the applicant’s professional credentials, tended to diminish public trust.
7. The prior interim suspension did not determine the appropriate final sanction because the interim-order test and the sanction test differed. The six-month suspension was directed principally to the continuing impairment and the need to mark seriousness, facilitate reflection and protect public confidence. The absence of a patient-safety risk did not make the sanction or immediate order disproportionate.

This was an appeal to the High Court under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 from decisions of the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal made in June 2022. The appeal was dismissed.