Julie Tiernan-Spratt (on her own behalf and on behalf of the Dependants of the Estate of Dominic Spratt deceased) v City of Wolverhampton Council

In an application for relief from sanctions, failure to establish a good reason for default does not conclude the analysis. At the third stage of Denton, the court must assess any mitigating explanation, including whether the breach resulted from an understandable and conscientious judgment rather than deliberate defiance. It must also consider prejudice to the court and the administration of justice, not only prejudice to the opposing party. This may be especially important where exclusion of direct evidence would require allegations of dishonesty to be determined largely from indirect evidence. Relief may properly be granted where admission causes less prejudice than exclusion, the application is prompt, the trial is not imperilled, and the evidence is materially relevant. The decision remains fact-sensitive and does not relax compliance with court orders generally.

The Council appealed against a District Judge’s refusal to grant relief from sanctions. The Council had served three witness statements approximately 12 months after the deadline. The evidence concerned the deceased’s childhood and was relevant to allegations that his account of abuse was fabricated, to causation, and to a defence under Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, section 57.

The District Judge found the breach serious or significant and found no good reason for the delay. Although no trial date was jeopardised, she concluded that admitting the evidence would disrupt the proceedings and that the sanction was proportionate. The central issues on appeal were whether the absence of a good reason was properly assessed and whether all the circumstances were adequately evaluated at the third stage of Denton.

1. The appeal was allowed. The court applied the three-stage approach in Denton. The 12-month delay was serious or significant, and the District Judge was entitled to find that the explanation did not amount to a good reason.

2. That conclusion did not end the enquiry. At the third stage, the court had to calibrate the explanation. The decision not to approach the deceased’s mother was not deliberate defiance of the order. It was a conscientious judgment made in highly sensitive circumstances, maintained until further advice was obtained. Even an explanation falling short of a good reason may materially mitigate the breach.

3. The District Judge also failed adequately to consider prejudice to the court and the administration of justice. The additional statements were direct evidence bearing on important credibility and dishonesty issues. Excluding them would leave the court to determine those issues principally from the absence of records and expert evidence. The court’s ability to reach a fair decision is a relevant circumstance under CPR 3.9(1), particularly where section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 could require dismissal of the entire personal injury claim following a finding of fundamental dishonesty.

4. The prejudice caused by admitting the evidence was less than the prejudice caused by excluding it. There was no relevant previous default, the trial date was not affected, the application was prompt, and the evidence was highly relevant. A costs consequence was a more proportionate response than exclusion.

5. Relief from sanctions was therefore granted. Consequential directions and costs were left for further consideration.

• High Court (King's Bench Division): appeal from the District Judge’s refusal of relief from sanctions allowed. Permission to appeal had been granted by Mr Justice Martin Spencer.