Gleema Nambiar v Georges Emile Karam

A final foreign judgment of a court with jurisdiction is generally recognised and enforced, subject to established conflict-of-laws defences such as fraud and public policy. The enforcing court does not reopen the foreign court’s findings for alleged errors of fact or law under the foreign law.

A foreign judgment cannot itself transfer or vest an interest in immovable property situated in England and Wales. That rule applies whether the judgment is characterised as in rem or in personam. The court may nevertheless enforce severable monetary provisions. Where two conflicting foreign judgments exist, the general rule is to recognise the earlier judgment, subject to possible estoppel.

The claimant sought recognition and enforcement in England of a Florida divorce judgment against her former husband. The judgment awarded monetary sums and purported to transfer a London property to her.

The defendant relied on a later Lebanese divorce judgment, challenged the Florida court’s treatment of the monetary award, asserted that the award was a penalty, and disputed enforcement of the property provisions. The third party claimed a beneficial interest in the London property and was not bound by the Florida judgment.

The court determined whether the Florida judgment could be enforced, whether the claimant could pursue her monetary claims after an earlier concession, and whether the property provisions were recognisable in England.

1. Summary judgment. The second application was treated together with the first. The defendant had sufficient notice and was not materially prejudiced. Points of law could be decided summarily where the parties had a proper opportunity to address them and no realistically available trial evidence could affect the outcome.
2. Recognition of the monetary provisions. The Florida judgment was final and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Its monetary awards could not be challenged on the basis that they were erroneous under Florida law, because recognition proceedings do not reopen the foreign judgment on its merits. The lump sum was an award arising from an unequal distribution of assets, not the unpaid purge amount or a fine or penalty. It was therefore enforceable as a debt or definite sum of money. The alimony claim was limited to $47,164.10 because the claimant’s remarriage extinguished future entitlement.
3. Withdrawal of concession. The claimant was not estopped from pursuing the monetary claims. There was no evidence that the defendant had acted to his detriment in reliance on the concession. The principles governing withdrawal of concessions after a determination, including those discussed in BT Pension Scheme Trustees Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc and another [2011] EWHC 2071 (Ch), did not apply before any determination had been made. Refusing withdrawal would be disproportionate.
4. Conflicting judgments. The Lebanese judgment did not address the London property and therefore did not conflict with the Florida judgment. Even if there had been a conflict, the general English rule would give primacy to the earlier judgment, subject to estoppel. The United States last-in-time rule discussed in Showlag v Mansour and Others [1994] 1 AC was irrelevant.
5. London property. Applying the principles explained in Pattni v Ali and Another [2006] UKPC 51, the courts and law of the place where immovable property is situated control its transfer. The Florida judgment purported to vest and convey the London property. That disposal was incapable of recognition or enforcement in England, and the direction to transfer title was integral to it and could not be severed. The Florida judgment was therefore enforced as to the monetary claims but not as to the London property. The claimant’s property claim was dismissed, and the third-party claim was rendered otiose, subject to further argument on costs.