Attorney General v Shannon Tyreck Rolle & others (The Bahamas)

Article 6 of the Constitution of The Bahamas confers citizenship at birth on every person born in The Bahamas after independence where either biological parent was a Bahamian citizen at the date of birth. Article 14(1), which directs that references to the “father” of a person born out of wedlock be construed as references to the mother, does not qualify the word “parents” in article 6. Different constitutional terms should be given different meanings where the context supports that reading. A court should not introduce an arbitrary and discriminatory restriction into a clear citizenship right through an indirect and strained construction. Later legislation cannot clarify an earlier constitutional provision where its meaning is clear, particularly where the later enactment addresses a different subject.

The Attorney General appealed to the Privy Council from a majority decision of the Court of Appeal of The Bahamas, which had upheld Winder J’s declaration that article 6 of the Constitution confers citizenship at birth on a child born in The Bahamas to an unmarried non-citizen mother and a Bahamian citizen father.

The respondents claimed to be such children and sought declarations of citizenship. The factual basis of their claims was left for later determination if legally relevant. The central issue was whether “either of his parents” in article 6 means the biological mother or father, or whether article 14(1) restricts the reference to a father of a child born out of wedlock.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Board would humbly advise His Majesty that the Constitution confers citizenship at birth on a person born in The Bahamas who is the child of an unmarried non-citizen woman and a Bahamian citizen man.
2. The Court of Appeal had approached the appeal incorrectly by asking whether Winder J’s decision was plainly wrong. Interpretation of the Constitution is a pure question of law with a correct answer. The Board therefore had to determine the correct interpretation for itself.
3. The natural meaning of article 6 is broad. “Every person” and “either of his parents” refer to a person’s biological parents at birth. Article 14(1) applies to an express reference to the “father” of a person. It qualifies the references to “father” in articles 3(2) and 8, but does not indirectly qualify “parents” in article 6.
4. That conclusion follows from the language and structure of Chapter II. Reading article 14(1) into article 6 would require a convoluted construction, would make the use of different terms inexplicable, and would produce anomalous results. It would also introduce discrimination based on illegitimacy and on whether the Bahamian parent was the mother or father, without any textual necessity.
5. Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 confirms that constitutional instruments require an approach suited to their character, while respecting their language and context. It was unnecessary to adopt a more generous interpretation or rely on international human rights law because conventional interpretation resolved the issue.
6. Later legislation may sometimes clarify an ambiguous earlier enactment, but article 6 was clear. Section 6 of the Bahamas Nationality Act 1973 concerned discretionary registration, not acquisition of citizenship as a birthright. Section 3 of the Status of Children Act 2002 could not assist and expressly excluded rules relating to citizenship from its scope.

• Court of Appeal of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas: By a majority (Crane-Scott, Isaacs and Jones JJA), upheld Winder J’s decision. Sir Michael Barnett P and Evans JA dissented.
• Privy Council: Dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal and upheld the conclusion that article 6 confers citizenship at birth in the stated circumstances.