Chandra Silochan and another v Rickie Cedeno (Trinidad and Tobago)

A failure to comply with a planning enforcement notice may constitute one continuing summary offence, rather than separate initial and continuing offences. The offence may be prosecuted by reference to any period during which the failure continues. The statutory limitation period runs from the time when the particular matter of complaint arose, so events occurring more than six months before the complaint must be excluded. A conviction for the first day of non-compliance is not a precondition to prosecuting a later period. A prosecution is confined to the period pleaded in the complaint; offending after its stated end date requires a further complaint.

The appellants were convicted in the Magistrates’ Court of failing to comply with an enforcement notice requiring demolition of unauthorised building works, contrary to section 18(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act. The Magistrate imposed a fine for an alleged initial offence and a substantial daily fine for an alleged continuing offence.

The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago set aside the convictions and fines for the initial offence as out of time, but upheld the convictions and sentence for the continuing offence, subject to removing hard labour from the default imprisonment. The issues before the Board included the nature of the statutory offence, the effect of the six-month limitation in section 33(2) of the Summary Courts Act, the pleaded end date, and the Magistrate’s failure to provide written reasons.

1. Appeals allowed in part. Section 18(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act creates a single offence which may continue over a period. It provides two potential maximum fines for that single offence: TT$1,500 for the first day covered by the complaint and TT$300 for each subsequent day.
2. The reference to “the first day” means the first day covered by the complaint, not the first day on which non-compliance began. A prior conviction for the first day of non-compliance is not a precondition to conviction for a later period. The offence is the continuing failure to take the required steps, although that failure gives rise to a cause for complaint on each day it occurs.
3. Under section 33(2) of the Summary Courts Act, time runs from when the particular matter of complaint arose. The complaint made on 9 October 2008 could not encompass events before 9 April 2008. Those earlier events had to be excluded.
4. The prosecution was also confined to the period pleaded, ending on 4 August 2008. The appellants could not be convicted or sentenced for subsequent non-compliance. A later period requires a further complaint. The convictions were therefore amended to cover the single offence continuously committed from 9 April to 4 August 2008.
5. The failure to draw up and sign written reasons under section 130B(1) of the Summary Courts Act did not invalidate the convictions. The Magistrate’s reasoning could be discerned from the record, the issues at trial and her oral reasons, permitting meaningful appellate review.
6. The fine of TT$815,200 and the default imprisonment were set aside. Sentencing on the amended convictions was remitted to the Court of Appeal, which was to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, totality, and the circumstances relevant to imprisonment in default of payment under section 68(1) of the Summary Courts Act.

• Privy Council: amended the convictions to a single offence covering 9 April to 4 August 2008, set aside the substantial fine and default imprisonment, and remitted sentencing to the Court of Appeal.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: set aside the convictions and TT$700 fines for the alleged initial offence as time-barred; upheld the continuing-offence convictions and TT$815,200 fine; removed hard labour from the default imprisonment.
• Magistrates’ Court: convicted both appellants under section 18(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act; fines and default imprisonment imposed.