Naomi Rachel Knapp v Bristol City Council

A banning order under Part 2 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 is discretionary. The First-tier Tribunal must consider the seriousness of the offence, but may give considerable weight to the sentence imposed by the criminal court. It may also use its general specialist knowledge of sentencing levels.

The statutory power to ban a person from “letting housing” can extend to existing tenancies. An appellate tribunal may interfere with an evaluative or discretionary decision only for an error of law or an identifiable flaw undermining the conclusion.

Bristol City Council applied to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) for a banning order against Naomi Knapp after she pleaded guilty to eight banning-order offences concerning the management and licensing of houses in multiple occupation. The FTT imposed a five-year ban from letting housing and engaging in letting agency or property management work, with a six-month delay before the ban applied to existing tenancies.

Knapp appealed, arguing that the FTT had unlawfully relied on the magistrates’ fines rather than making its own assessment of seriousness, used undisclosed knowledge of fine levels, and lacked power to prohibit continuation of existing tenancies. The central issues were the proper appellate approach, the assessment of seriousness under section 16(4)(a), and the scope of a ban on “letting housing”.

1. Appeal dismissed. The FTT’s decision involved evaluation and discretion. Applying Sutton v Norwich City Council [2021] EWCA Civ 20, the Upper Tribunal could interfere only for an error of law or an identifiable flaw in the reasoning, such as a gap in logic, inconsistency, or failure to consider a material factor.
2. Section 16(4)(a) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 requires the FTT to consider the seriousness of the offence. It does not prescribe the weight to be given to the criminal sentence. The FTT could disregard or give limited weight to the fines, but was also entitled to give them considerable weight. It did not unlawfully delegate the issue to the magistrates or reopen the criminal proceedings.
3. The FTT was entitled to use its general specialist knowledge of fines imposed for housing offences. It was also entitled to consider the guilty pleas, the pattern of offending, the Council’s evidence, the Guidance and its own policy. It was not required to treat all banning-order offences as automatically justifying a ban.
4. The phrase “letting housing” in section 14(1) can include continuing to be a landlord under existing tenancies. Section 17(4)(a), which permits exceptions for existing tenancies, would be unnecessary if a banning order could apply only to new lettings. The statutory scheme supports protecting current tenants as well as prospective tenants.
5. The remaining grounds disclosed no error of law. The stay was lifted, but the application of the order to existing tenancies was postponed until 1 December 2023. The appellant could apply to the FTT by 6 October 2023 for further consideration.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): The appeal from the First-tier Tribunal’s banning order was dismissed. The stay was lifted and the date for application to existing tenancies was substituted as 1 December 2023.
• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): On 16 August 2022, a five-year banning order was made against the appellant, with its application to existing tenancies delayed for six months.