James Coombs v Information Commissioner & Anor

Tribunal reasons must identify the issues vital to the conclusion and explain how they were resolved. The required detail depends on the nature of the case. A tribunal need not address every argument, but its reasons must enable the parties and an appellate tribunal to understand the essential reasoning. This obligation is not reduced where evidence was considered in a closed session. Where a material factual finding rests on reasoned opinion about future effects, and that opinion is rationally challenged, credibility and reliability alone may not adequately explain rejecting the challenge. An inadequately explained factor which receives decisive or overbearing weight in a public-interest balance is a material error of law.

The appellant appealed against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber), reference EA/2020/0310, which had dismissed his appeal under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 against an Information Commissioner decision notice.

The dispute concerned information about errors in an 11-plus secondary transfer test administered for The Buckinghamshire Grammar Schools. The First-tier Tribunal found that the statistician’s report was not held by the schools or by another person on their behalf, and upheld reliance on sections 41 and 43 of the Act for other withheld information. The Upper Tribunal considered whether the First-tier Tribunal had adequately explained its findings and its public-interest balancing exercise.

1. Appeal allowed and decision set aside. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision involved an error of law. The case was remitted for a complete rehearing before a freshly constituted panel at an oral hearing.
2. On adequacy of reasons, the tribunal had to identify the substantial or principal controversial issues and explain how those issues were resolved. It was sufficient on the question whether the statistician’s report was held for the First-tier Tribunal to rely on direct evidence from witnesses whom it had found credible and reliable, together with the absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence expressly to the contrary. Ground a was therefore not made out.
3. The position differed in relation to the alleged advantage to private tutors. The First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion rested on reasoned opinions about the future effect of disclosure. The appellant had raised rational and intelligible challenges, including whether knowledge of the number of questions could produce the suggested coaching advantage and whether the proposed strategy differed materially from guessing unanswered questions. The First-tier Tribunal did not explain why those challenges were rejected. A bare assessment of the witnesses as competent, credible and reliable was insufficient in those circumstances.
4. The inadequately explained finding was material. The First-tier Tribunal had given the tutors’ advantage factor overbearing weight in the public-interest balance. Removing that factor materially changed the balance. The error affected both section 41 and section 43, because the First-tier Tribunal imported its section 41 analysis into its section 43 reasoning.
5. The closed-session material did not reduce the standard of reasons required. It was unnecessary to determine ground c, concerning the formulation of the public-interest balance in relation to actionable breach of confidence, because that issue would be considered afresh on remittal.
6. The remitted panel was directed to treat it as established that the statistician’s report was not held by the schools or by another person on their behalf at the relevant times.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): appeal allowed; the First-tier Tribunal decision under reference EA/2020/0310 was set aside and the case remitted for a complete rehearing.
• First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber): decision dated 22 February 2022 dismissed the appeal under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and upheld the Information Commissioner’s decision notice.