E Williams v The Information Commissioner

When reviewing a finding that an information request is vexatious, the Upper Tribunal asks whether the First-tier Tribunal gave intelligible reasons, considering its statement of reasons as a whole. A request may have a serious purpose when viewed in isolation yet be vexatious in its wider context. Relevant context may include earlier requests, previous explanations for refusing disclosure, the value of disclosure while an investigation is ongoing, and the burden imposed on the public authority. A tribunal need not have previously balanced the public interests under a qualified exemption before finding a later request vexatious under Freedom of Information Act 2000, section 14.

Mr E Williams appealed to the Upper Tribunal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber), made on 17 February 2021 in case EA 2020/0015. The First-tier Tribunal had upheld the Information Commissioner’s conclusion that a request to the Independent Office for Police Conduct for image evidence and medical reports concerning a death following arrest was vexatious under section 14 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

The appeal alleged inadequate reasons. Mr Williams argued that the First-tier Tribunal should not have treated the request as vexatious without a previous tribunal decision balancing disclosure against qualified exemptions concerning ongoing investigations. The central issue was whether the First-tier Tribunal had adequately explained its decision.

1. Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve a material error of law. The Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to deciding whether there was an error on a point of law; it was not entitled to determine afresh whether the request was vexatious.
2. Reasons are inadequate if they fail to convey to the unsuccessful party why the relevant issue was decided against them. The reasons must be assessed by reference to the tribunal’s statement as a whole, applying Clarke Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) 66 P & CR 263.
3. The First-tier Tribunal gave an intelligible explanation for its conclusion. It identified two principal considerations operating in combination: Mr Williams had received several explanations for refusals to disclose information while investigations or proceedings remained ongoing; and disclosure at the relevant time had no public value because it was likely to jeopardise the prospects of offenders being brought to justice.
4. The First-tier Tribunal was not required to explain the absence of a previous judicial balancing exercise under a qualified exemption. That absence resulted from Mr Williams’s decision not to challenge the earlier refusals. Although he was entitled to make that choice, it formed part of the context. The present request was the latest in a series of similar requests to the same authority, many refused by reference to qualified exemptions.
5. The authorities on section 14, including Information Commissioner v Devon County Council & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC), [2015] EWCA Civ 454 and CP v the Information Commissioner [2016] UKUT 0427 (AAC), required consideration of the wider context. They did not require a request with an apparent serious purpose to be treated as incapable of being vexatious.
6. The appeal was dismissed under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 17 February 2021 did not involve a material error on a point of law.
• First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber): upheld the finding that Mr Williams’s request was vexatious under section 14 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.