Anthony Charles Clapham & Ors v Dee Narga

The general boundaries rule means that a registered title plan normally identifies the property but does not fix the exact boundary. This remains so where the boundary has changed through adverse possession. Whether a dispute concerns a boundary or title depends on its circumstances, including the relative size and importance of the land in issue. Section 75 of the Land Registration Act 1925 cannot apply where title was extinguished by adverse possession before first registration. It also cannot affect land outside the registered estate. A later purchaser takes no greater title than the vendor had.

The parties owned adjoining properties and disputed a strip of land between a brook and a fence. The County Court at Leicester found that the appellants had acquired the strip by adverse possession, but held that they lost it when the respondent acquired and registered Brook Barn.

Leech J dismissed their appeal in [2023] EWHC 3337 (Ch). The appellants challenged the treatment of the title plan under the general boundaries rule, the application of section 75 of the Land Registration Act 1925, and the operation of section 29 of the Land Registration Act 2002. The central issue was whether the registered title to Brook Barn included the disputed strip.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. The Fence remained the boundary between the parties’ properties, and the appellants were entitled to be registered as proprietors of the disputed land.
2. The general boundaries rule, formerly found in rule 278 of the Land Registration Rules 1925 and now in section 60 of the Land Registration Act 2002, means that a title plan does not normally determine the exact boundary. That principle applies whether the uncertainty arises from construction of conveyances or from adverse possession. The boundary must instead be determined by the other principles governing the extent of ownership.
3. Whether a dispute is properly characterised as a boundary dispute or a property dispute is fact-sensitive. Relevant considerations include the size of the disputed land relative to the remainder of the registered title and whether the land has particular importance to the registered proprietor. The disputed strip was small, contained no buildings and had no demonstrated special importance. The case was therefore a boundary dispute. The Court applied the reasoning in Lee v Barrey [1957] Ch 251 and Drake v Fripp [2011] EWCA Civ 1279, [2012] 1 P&CR 4, and distinguished Parshall v Bryans [2013] EWCA Civ 240, [2013] Ch 568.
4. By the time Brook Barn was first registered, the appellants had acquired title to the disputed land through adverse possession. The registered title therefore stopped at the Fence. The title plan could not enlarge it.
5. Section 75 of the Land Registration Act 1925 did not apply. First, the disputed land was outside the registered title. Secondly, section 75 was directed to extinction occurring after registration and did not operate where title had already been extinguished before first registration. The observations in St Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Fairweather [1962] 1 QB 498, [1963] AC 510 supported that conclusion.
6. Section 29 of the Land Registration Act 2002 could not postpone the appellants’ interests because the registered estate acquired by the respondent never included the disputed land. The respondent acquired no more than her vendor had.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — allowed the appeal and held that the Fence remained the boundary and that the appellants were entitled to registration of the disputed land.
• High Court, Business and Property Courts in Birmingham (ChD) — Leech J dismissed the appeal from the County Court in [2023] EWHC 3337 (Ch).
• County Court at Leicester — Judge Hedley held that the appellants had acquired title by adverse possession but had lost it on the respondent’s purchase of Brook Barn.