Oliver Campbell v R

In a long-delayed conviction appeal, the court must decide whether the conviction is unsafe. The fact that a trial would be conducted differently today, or that modern safeguards were unavailable, does not by itself make the conviction unsafe. Fresh expert evidence about vulnerability and false confessions must be assessed in the context of the whole case. It may matter if it could have changed admissibility rulings or the evidential picture. Where a conviction is quashed, any retrial requires a balance between the public interest in prosecuting serious crime and the defendant’s legitimate interests. The passage of time, punishment already served and cognitive disability may make a fair retrial impossible.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to rob and murder at the Central Criminal Court in 1991. His first appeal was dismissed in 1994, reported at [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 522. Following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission under section 9(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, the appeal was treated as an appeal against conviction.

The reference relied principally on fresh expert evidence concerning the appellant’s intellectual disability, vulnerability and the reliability of his police admissions. The court also considered statements by his co-accused said to exonerate him. The central questions were whether the fresh material could reasonably have affected the jury’s decision and, if the convictions were quashed, whether a retrial would be in the interests of justice.

1. Appeal and fresh evidence. The court formally received the fresh evidence to the extent indicated. The evidence of statements by Samuels could carry very little weight and could not afford a ground of appeal. Professor Gudjonsson’s evidence was received but given limited weight because of the shortcomings identified in his earlier assessment and later explanations. Dr Beck’s evidence was given substantially greater weight.
2. Earlier grounds. Leave was refused for grounds unrelated to the CCRC’s reasons. Most sought to re-run matters that had been, or could have been, advanced at trial or in the 1994 appeal. Other allegations lacked an evidential foundation.
3. Applicable approach. Applying the principles in R v Bentley (Derek William) (deceased) [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 21, R v King (Ashley) [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 391, R v Hanratty (deceased) [2002] EWCA Crim 1141 and R v Hussain (Abid) [2005] EWCA Crim 31, modern standards and later safeguards do not alone render an old conviction unsafe. The court must assess safety in the light of all the material before it. The court was inclined to accept that a long extension of time based on changed practice or fairness standards might require proof of substantial injustice, but it did not decide that issue.
4. Safety of the convictions. Under the approach in R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66, the court made its own assessment of the fresh evidence and asked whether it might reasonably have affected the jury’s decision. The fresh expert evidence supplied material information about the appellant’s mental state and the risk of false confession that was not, and could not have been, known at trial. It created a real possibility that the admissibility rulings and the evidential picture would have been materially different. The convictions were therefore unsafe.
5. Retrial. Exercising the discretion under section 7(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, and applying the balancing approach in R v Graham and others [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302, the court concluded that the public interest in prosecution was outweighed by the appellant’s inability, after the passage of more than three decades, to address the central confession evidence fairly. The convictions were quashed and no retrial was ordered.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The CCRC reference was treated as an appeal under section 9(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed and a retrial was declined.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appellant’s 1994 appeal against conviction was dismissed, reported at [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 522.
3. Central Criminal Court: The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to rob and murder in 1991 and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder.