R v Hassan Serdoud

In proceedings for failing to surrender to bail, the accused bears the burden of proving a reasonable cause. A judge’s prior involvement as trial judge, including adverse credibility findings, does not by itself create apparent bias. The question is assessed objectively, having regard to the judge’s self-direction, conduct during the hearing and judicial role. A court may reject medical evidence that it finds unsatisfactory. A later voluntary return does not compel acceptance that the accused previously intended to return. Deliberate evasion of sentence may justify the highest culpability category and assessment of harm to the criminal justice system as a whole. A sentence for breach of bail is, as a matter of principle, consecutive to the substantive sentence.

The appellant was convicted by HHJ Hehir at the Crown Court at Southwark of failing to surrender to bail under the Bail Act 1976. He received two months’ imprisonment consecutive to a sentence of four years and six months for bribery. The substantive conviction and sentence had already been the subject of an unsuccessful application for permission to appeal, reported at [2024] EWCA Crim 644.

The appellant challenged the Bail Act conviction on grounds of apparent bias and unreasonable factual findings concerning his medical condition, intention to return and reasonable cause. He also challenged the sentencing category, assessment of harm and consecutive nature of the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

1. Proceedings under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976 may be conducted summarily or as criminal contempt. The accused bears the burden of proving reasonable cause for failing to surrender.
2. The judge’s prior involvement as trial judge did not disqualify him from determining the subsequent quasi-contempt proceedings. The court agreed with the principle in Shaw v Kovak [2017] 1 WLR 4773. The judge’s previous finding that the appellant had been dishonest and manipative did not establish apparent bias. He had expressly warned himself against assuming that the appellant’s evidence in the Bail Act proceedings was dishonest or manipulative.
3. The apparent-bias question was objective. The judge’s challenging interventions were numerous but not excessive, and he had responsibility for determining whether contempt had occurred. His conduct did not cause a reasonable and informed observer to suspect bias.
4. The judge was entitled to reject the medical material and find that the appellant could have returned with appropriate assistance. The reports contained self-reported material, inconsistencies and inadequate independent observation. The appellant’s later voluntary return did not require the court to accept that he had intended to return in January. The evidence supported the finding that he had travelled to Morocco intending to avoid or delay sentence for as long as possible.
5. Those findings justified treating the failure as deliberate evasion within category 1A culpability. The harm extended to the criminal justice system as a whole, not merely to the appellant’s individual case. The six-week starting point could be increased to reflect the lengthy absence abroad.
6. It was a matter of principle that sentence for breach of bail should be consecutive to the substantive sentence.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The court dismissed the appeals against conviction and sentence on 30 October 2024.
2. Crown Court at Southwark. HHJ Hehir convicted the appellant summarily of failing to surrender to bail and sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment consecutive to the substantive sentence.