R v Luke Vincent Rouse

In sentencing for false imprisonment, associated violence, threats and theft will ordinarily be treated as aggravating features of the lead offence and sentenced concurrently. Offending committed after the imprisonment has ended, such as a later burglary, may be sentenced separately and consecutively, subject to totality. False imprisonment has no sentencing guideline, so gravity is fact-specific. Relevant considerations include the detention’s duration and circumstances, restraint, violence, weapons, demands or threats, impact, planning, number of offenders, torture or humiliation, links with previous criminal behaviour and victim vulnerability. A double-figure sentence may be justified without hostage-taking or ransom, but there is no automatic ten-year starting point. A severe aggregate sentence is not manifestly excessive where it properly reflects the totality and seriousness of the offending.

The applicant renewed an application for leave to appeal against a sentence of 11 years and three months imposed by HHJ Lawrie at the Crown Court at Plymouth on 19 January 2018. The sentence covered wounding with intent, false imprisonment, burglary, fraud, handling stolen goods, attempting to escape lawful custody and assaults.

The renewal was substantially out of time. On the merits, the applicant challenged the use of aggravating features in sentencing for both wounding with intent and false imprisonment, and argued that consecutive sentences for burglary, fraud and other offending produced a manifestly excessive total. The central issues were whether time should be extended and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Extension of time. The original application was accompanied by an application to extend time by 35 days. The delay resulted from the applicant twice failing to attend his legal advisers in custody. That did not provide a good reason. The renewal application was approximately 2,170 days late, and the applicant’s assertion that he had only recently learned of the renewal procedure also did not provide a good reason. The extension application was refused.
2. Sentencing structure. False imprisonment is commonly accompanied by threats, assault and theft. The usual approach is to treat false imprisonment as the lead offence, with associated offending reflected as aggravating features and sentenced concurrently. However, where the defendant returns after the imprisonment has ended and commits a burglary, the burglary may properly be sentenced separately. Subject to totality, the sentencing judge was also entitled to impose consecutive sentences for the offending in the second and third indictments.
3. Gravity of false imprisonment. The court applied the fact-specific approach identified in Attorney General's Reference Nos 102 and 103 of 2014 [2014] EWCA Crim 2922. The absence of hostage-taking or ransom does not prevent a double-figure sentence, but R v Croxall [2016] EWCA Crim 1344 makes clear that this does not establish a ten-year starting point in every case. The relevant assessment includes the factors identified in Attorney General's Reference Nos 92 to 93 of 2014 [2014] EWCA Crim 2713: the length and circumstances of detention, restraint, violence, weapons, demands and threats, effects on the victim and others, planning, number of offenders, torture or humiliation, links with previous criminal behaviour and vulnerability.
4. Application and result. The offending involved a vulnerable victim in his own home, substantial violence, restraint, humiliation, terrorising, conduct amounting to torture and attempts to obtain financial benefit. The nine-year sentence for false imprisonment reflected 12 years before credit for plea. The court considered that the sentencing judge would have been entitled to impose a substantial sentence for the wounding and false imprisonment even without the later burglary and fraud. The individual consecutive sentences were not manifestly excessive, and the severe aggregate sentence was justified by the totality of the offending. The application for leave to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewal application was refused as out of time. The application for leave to appeal was also refused because the sentence was not reasonably arguable to be manifestly excessive.
2. Crown Court at Plymouth: HHJ Lawrie imposed a total sentence of 11 years and three months on 19 January 2018.