R v Shuhang Meyan Limbu

Passing the custody threshold does not make immediate imprisonment inevitable. The court must still consider whether a community sentence or suspended sentence can achieve the purposes of sentencing, including rehabilitation and personal mitigation. In sentencing a young adult who has offended with older peers, the age gap may be a material difference even without an express finding of immaturity. It may justify a lesser sentence where the offender’s developmental susceptibility to peer pressure and impulsivity is relevant. Delay may also weigh more heavily on a younger offender where it represents a significant proportion of that person’s life. Sentences for co-defendants need not be identical where their ages and personal circumstances materially differ.

The appellant, aged 21 at sentence and 19 at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.47. He received 13 months’ immediate imprisonment at the Crown Court at Inner London after participating with two older co-defendants in a prolonged group assault on a vulnerable homeless man.

Following refusal by the single judge, the appellant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. The appeal concerned role differentiation, the treatment of his mitigation and age, and whether the sentence should have been suspended.

1. Appeal allowed in part. Leave to appeal was granted. The sentence of 13 months’ immediate imprisonment was quashed and replaced with a determinate sentence of 10 months.
2. The offence was a brutal, sustained and extremely violent instance of group violence against a weaker and obviously vulnerable individual. The custody threshold was passed because neither a fine nor a community sentence could properly be justified.
3. Passing the custody threshold did not make immediate custody inevitable. The Sentencing Council guidance identified a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and strong personal mitigation as factors supporting suspension. The sentencing judge was nevertheless entitled, having regard to the facts of the offence, to conclude that immediate custody was required as punishment.
4. There was little difference between the defendants’ involvement, although one co-defendant had played a marginally more active role. Their broadly equal participation justified treating their roles as similar. Their mitigation was compelling, including good character, remorse, employment, rehabilitation prospects and the prolonged delay before sentence.
5. The appellant’s age was a material differentiating factor. He was six or seven years younger than his co-defendants. Young adults remain developmentally susceptible to peer pressure, risk-taking and impulsivity, and reaching 18 is not a cliff edge for sentencing purposes, as recognised in Clarke [2018] EWCA Crim 185. The age gap itself could justify a lesser sentence even without a specific finding of immaturity in the pre-sentence report.
6. The delay of two years and three months would weigh more heavily on the appellant because it represented more than 10 per cent of his life. Imposing the same 13-month sentence on him as on his older co-defendants was manifestly excessive. The court also took account of the current conditions in custody, referring to R v Arie Ali [2023] EWCA Crim 232. A representation order was made for junior counsel.

• Crown Court at Inner London: The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 13 months’ immediate imprisonment.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Following refusal by the single judge, the renewed application for leave was granted. The sentence was quashed and replaced with a determinate sentence of 10 months.