R v Jaspreet Singh

A victim personal statement may help the sentencing court assess the effects of an offence, but it is evidence and must be served in time for the defence to take instructions and raise any objection. It should not be used to introduce allegations of additional offending that were not part of the prosecution case. Sentencing must also avoid double counting: where abuse of trust has increased culpability, the same evidence should not ordinarily aggravate sentence again through the location of the offence. An offence of sexual communication should be sentenced on the conduct particularised in the indictment. Material errors may render an otherwise serious sentence manifestly excessive.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Isleworth to four offences of sexual assault of a child under 13 and one offence of sexual communication with a child. He received a total sentence of three years’ imprisonment.

He appealed against sentence on grounds concerning the late victim personal statement, alleged double counting of the location of the assaults, insufficient mitigation, and reliance on more than one message when sentencing the communication offence. The central issues were whether the statement could support allegations of threatening conduct, whether the location was a separate aggravating factor, and whether count 7 should be sentenced by reference only to the message particularised in the indictment.

Appeal allowed in part.

1. Victim personal statement. The court relied on R v Perkins [2013] EWCA Crim 323; [2013] Cr App R(S) 72. A victim personal statement is the victim’s evidence. It should be in formal witness-statement form and served in good time for the defence to take instructions, prepare objections and consider whether further disclosure is required. Although such a statement may be made before disposal, the statement here was served only one day before sentence and gave the defence no realistic opportunity to respond.
2. The judge relied significantly on allegations that the appellant had threatened the victim and her family. Those allegations concerned conduct during the offending, had not formed part of the prosecution case, and had not previously been mentioned by the victim in interview. They went beyond the proper purpose of informing the court about the effects of the offending. It was therefore an error of principle to rely on them as an aggravating factor.
3. Double counting. The appellant’s breach of trust had already been relied on to place the assaults in the highest culpability level. The evidence of trust included his being permitted to live in the family home and care for the victim there. Treating the location of the offences as an additional aggravating factor therefore amounted to double counting.
4. Other grounds and disposal. The court rejected the complaint about insufficient weight to mitigation and the submission that the offending was less serious because sensitive parts of the victim’s body had not been touched. For the communication offence, sentence should have been based on the particularised message identified in the indictment.
5. The errors made the overall sentence manifestly excessive. The 30-month sentence on count 2 was quashed and 24 months substituted. The sentences on counts 3 and 6 remained concurrent. The six-month sentence on count 7 was quashed and three months substituted, consecutive to the other sentences. The total sentence was 27 months’ imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the appeal to the extent of quashing and substituting sentences, reducing the total sentence to 27 months’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Isleworth: imposed a total sentence of three years’ imprisonment after guilty pleas.