R v Louise Lennon

A sentencing guideline introduced after an offence must be applied, subject to the statutory maximum in force when the offence was committed. An offence of allowing a child's death is not presumed to be less serious than causing the death. Category B1 placement may be justified where the offender failed to protect a child from repeated serious cruelty involving high-culpability features such as sadistic behaviour and very significant force.

Prolonged suffering must not be counted again as an aggravating factor where it is already inherent in the high-culpability assessment. An identified error will not make a sentence manifestly excessive where independent aggravating features justify the sentence. A sentencing judge may find that PTSD does not reduce culpability while taking it into account in assessing the impact of custody.

The applicant and her former partner stood trial at the Central Criminal Court following the death of the applicant's 15-month-old son. The applicant pleaded guilty to cruelty to a person under 16 years and was convicted of causing or allowing the death of a child. Sweeting J sentenced her to 10 years' imprisonment for the latter offence, with a concurrent sentence of six years for cruelty.

A single judge refused leave to appeal against sentence. The applicant renewed her application before the full court, challenging the application of the sentencing guideline, her categorisation in category B1, alleged double counting, the effect of the statutory maximum, and the weight given to mitigation and mental health. The central question was whether the total sentence was manifestly excessive.

The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

1. The increase in the statutory maximum did not prevent application of the relevant sentencing guideline. As stated in R v AZT [2023] EWCA Crim 1277, the judge had to give effect to the guideline, subject to the maximum sentence in force when the offence was committed.
2. The guideline expressly applied to offences involving both causing and allowing the death of a child. It did not assume that allowing a death was necessarily less serious than causing it.
3. Category B1 was appropriate. The applicant had failed to protect Jacob from conduct involving at least three high-culpability features: multiple incidents of serious cruelty, sadistic behaviour and very significant force. She had also deliberately disregarded her son's welfare.
4. The court accepted that treating Jacob's prolonged suffering as an additional aggravating factor involved double counting because that suffering was the inevitable result of the multiple incidents of serious cruelty. That error did not undermine the sentence. The three high-culpability features independently justified movement above the category B1 starting point, and the impact on the applicant's older son was capable of being a further serious aggravating factor.
5. The sentencing judge had heard the applicant give evidence and was entitled to conclude that her PTSD did not materially reduce culpability. He had taken the condition into account when considering the impact of imprisonment and had plainly considered the personal mitigation.
6. There was no arguable basis for concluding that the total sentence was manifestly excessive. The renewed application therefore failed and was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence.
• Single judge refused the initial application for leave to appeal against sentence.
• Central Criminal Court convicted the applicant of causing or allowing the death of a child and sentenced her to 10 years' imprisonment, with a concurrent six-year sentence for cruelty to a person under 16 years.