R v Kamila Ahmad

On a delayed sentence for an offence committed in youth, the relevant starting point is the sentence likely to have been imposed at the time of the offence. A long delay and subsequent evidence that the offender has become dangerous may affect the reduction, if any, for youth: R v Ghafoor [2001] EWCA Crim 857.

An appellate court should not go behind a sentencing judge’s factual findings, particularly where that judge presided at trial, unless the findings are inconsistent with uncontradicted incontrovertible facts or irrational. A sentence reflecting the proper starting point, aggravation, mitigation and totality will not be disturbed merely because the offender disputes those assessments.

The applicant was convicted after trial at the Crown Court at Croydon of wounding with intent against a former partner and the murder of a later partner. On 19 April 2023, the sentencing judge imposed seven years’ imprisonment for the wounding, concurrent with life imprisonment for murder, with a minimum term of 23 years less time spent on remand.

She renewed her application for leave to appeal against sentence after the single judge refused leave. Her grounds challenged the length of the murder minimum term, the finding that she had not been a victim of domestic violence, the allowance for her age when committing the wounding, and the totality adjustment.

1. The court refused renewed leave to appeal against sentence. Having reviewed the matter afresh, it agreed with the single judge that none of the four grounds disclosed an arguable basis to interfere.

2. The sentencing judge was entitled to find, on the preponderance of the evidence heard at trial, that the applicant had been the controlling and coercive partner rather than a victim of domestic violence. He was particularly well placed to make that assessment because he had presided over the trial. The Court of Appeal could not go behind the finding: it was not inconsistent with other evidence, wholly uncontradicted by incontrovertible facts, or irrational.

3. The murder sentence began from the correct 15-year starting point because the judge could not be sure that the applicant had taken a knife to the scene. The substantial aggravating features, including prior threats, failure to seek assistance, concealment and relevant convictions, justified the increase. The judge also took account of the absence of an intention to kill, age and background.

4. As to the historic wounding, the single judge had correctly applied R v Ghafoor [2001] EWCA Crim 857. Youth was assessed by reference to the sentence likely at the date of the offence; the lengthy delay and the applicant’s subsequent offending could affect the appropriate reduction for youth. The concurrent seven-year sentence and the three-year increase in the murder minimum term properly reflected totality. The overall sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.
• Crown Court at Croydon: On 19 April 2023, following convictions after trial for wounding with intent and murder, the applicant received seven years’ imprisonment concurrent with life imprisonment, subject to a 23-year minimum term less 546 days on remand.