R v Hazrat Kharutti

When sentencing an offence of arranging or facilitating a child sexual offence, the court should avoid double counting conduct already reflected in the guideline classification. Where grooming forms a principal reason for placing the offence in culpability category A, the same short course of conduct should not ordinarily justify a substantial further uplift without additional aggravating features. The sentence must also reflect the absence of a real child, personal mitigation and any material delay not attributable to the offender. A brief period of online contact culminating in an arranged meeting may justify movement above the guideline starting point, but the uplift must be proportionate to the nature and duration of the offending.

The appellant was convicted in the Crown Court at Wolverhampton of two counts of attempting to incite a child to engage in sexual activity and one count of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence. The offences arose from online communications over six days with an adult decoy posing as a 13-year-old girl. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years on the attempts and eight years on the section 14 offence.

The sentencing judge placed the section 14 offence in category 1A, with a five-year starting point and a range of four to ten years, then uplifted the sentence to nine years before reducing it to eight years because no real child was involved. The appeal concerned the proportionality of that sentence, the treatment of the short duration of the conduct, double counting and delay.

The appeal was allowed. The sentences were quashed and replaced by four years and six months on count 3, with concurrent sentences of three years on counts 1 and 2. The surcharge was confirmed at £170.

1. The judge had correctly assessed the starting point and category range for the offence under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The revised guideline directed the court to assess harm by reference to the offender’s intended sexual activity where there was no real child or the intended activity did not take place.

2. The contact with the decoy lasted only six days and formed a single short course of conduct directed towards an arranged meeting which the appellant attended. The grooming conduct was one of the principal reasons why the offence fell within culpability A. Although the conduct could justify movement above the five-year starting point, its weight had to be tempered because it had already helped determine the guideline category.

3. The nine-year uplift involved double counting. The additional matters identified by the sentencing judge, including the youth of the supposed girl, the age disparity and the sexual images, did not independently justify so substantial an increase. The upward movement should have been limited to 12 months, producing a six-year figure before mitigation.

4. The absence of a real child, the appellant’s limited personal mitigation and material delay not attributable to him required a further reduction. The proceedings took four years and nine months from the offending to sentence, and a not insignificant part of that delay was outside his responsibility. An 18-month reduction produced four years and six months on count 3.

5. The sentence was significantly out of line with R v Reed & Ors [2021] EWCA Crim 572 and R v Nicholson [2023] EWCA Crim 413, where the sentencing approach reflected the revised guideline and the absence of a real child was taken into account.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against sentence from the Crown Court at Wolverhampton was allowed. The sentences imposed on 17 August 2023 were quashed and replaced with four years and six months on count 3 and concurrent sentences of three years on counts 1 and 2.
• Crown Court at Wolverhampton: On 17 August 2023 the appellant was convicted and sentenced to concurrent terms of four years on counts 1 and 2 and eight years on count 3.