William Sartin v R

In an interlocutory challenge to an order for trial without a jury under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a late adjournment to pursue fresh evidence may be refused where the proposed evidence is speculative or immaterial. The trial judge may assess jury tampering on the evidence available when the statutory decision must be made, balancing expedition with the prospect of further material evidence.

Proof that jury tampering occurred is sufficient. It is unnecessary to show that the defendant was responsible. Evidence that the alleged tamperer lacked an intention to frighten or influence jurors, or that the defendant was uninvolved, will not assist where the contemporaneous evidence entitled the judge to find tampering and discharge the jury.

William Sartin faced trial for conspiracy to evade the prohibition on exporting a Class A controlled drug, arising from the export to Australia of an excavator containing MDMA. During deliberations, a man previously excluded from the public gallery was said to have intimidated jurors outside the court. The parties and the judge agreed that jury tampering had occurred, and the jury was discharged.

On 12 February 2024, the Crown Court ordered that the trial continue without a jury under section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Mr Sartin challenged that ruling under section 47. Forty-eight hours before the hearing, he sought a four-week adjournment to investigate potential evidence from the man alleged to have tampered with the jury. The issue was whether the interests of justice required that adjournment.

1. Application to adjourn dismissed. The application was extremely late, unexplained in timing, and speculative. It depended on evidence which might not be forthcoming and on the willingness of a man under investigation to testify.

2. The Crown Court judge was entitled to determine jury tampering on the material then available. Under section 46(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the judge must balance the need to decide the trial’s status and the importance of expedition against the state of the evidence and the prospect that further police enquiries will produce material evidence. The contemporaneous material amply supported the finding and the discharge of the jury.

3. Assuming in Mr Sartin’s favour that the Court of Appeal had inherent jurisdiction to admit fresh evidence on a section 47 interlocutory appeal, he would still need leave, substantially out of time, to amend his grounds and adduce it. The court did not decide that jurisdictional question.

4. Proof of jury tampering is all that the statutory scheme requires. It is irrelevant whether the defendant was responsible. Evidence that he was uninvolved would therefore not assist. Nor would evidence that the alleged tamperer lacked an intention to frighten jurors or influence their deliberations materially assist, even if admissible, on the facts before the court.

5. The substantive section 47 application was urgent and ready to be heard. The court therefore proceeded to hear it rather than delay the trial’s resolution.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed Mr Sartin’s application to adjourn the hearing of his challenge under section 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to the Crown Court’s section 46 ruling.

• Crown Court at Kingston-upon-Thames: on 12 February 2024, ordered that the trial continue without a jury under section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, following jury tampering.