R v Donovan Neil Thomas

Sentencing disparity between co-defendants does not require equal sentences. Different minimum terms are justified where they reflect material differences in culpability or personal mitigation, including age, maturity, vulnerability, criminal record, role and influence. On a renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence, intervention is not arguable where the sentencing judge’s assessment of involvement was open to him and the sentence is not arguably manifestly excessive. A sense of unfairness cannot displace a properly justified distinction.

After trial at the Crown Court at Winchester, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a 27-year minimum term. Two co-defendants received 23-year minimum terms, reflecting their youth, immaturity and vulnerability. The applicant was older, had a worse criminal record and was found to have had a controlling influence in the joint enterprise. The starting point and uplift were conceded. Following refusal by the single judge, the renewed application raised only whether the difference between the sentences was unjustified and rendered the applicant’s sentence manifestly excessive.

1. Outcome. The renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence was refused.
2. Sentencing disparity. Different sentences for co-defendants do not require justification by identical personal circumstances. The relevant question is whether the difference is sufficiently explained by material distinctions in culpability, role or mitigation. Relevant distinctions may include age, maturity, vulnerability, mental health, previous convictions and influence over other participants.
3. Application. The trial judge treated Schedule 21 paragraph 4 of the Sentencing Act 2000 as providing a 25-year starting point. The applicant conceded that the starting point and the uplift to 27 years were fully justified and were not arguably manifestly excessive. The judge had found a planned revenge attack carried out as a true joint enterprise. Although the applicant did not stab the victim, he was older, had a substantial criminal record, was the leader of the drug line and exercised considerable influence over his younger and vulnerable co-defendants. He had no personal mitigation.
4. The co-defendants’ reductions reflected their youth, immaturity and individual vulnerability. The sentencing judge, having presided over the lengthy trial, was best placed to assess the applicant’s involvement. Those differences sufficiently justified the 27-year minimum term. There was no arguable case that the sentence was manifestly excessive or that the applicant had been treated unjustifiably differently.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On the renewed application, permission to appeal against sentence was refused.
2. Crown Court at Winchester: Following trial, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a 27-year minimum term.