Leszek Robert Gomulka v Poland (No 2)

Certification for an appeal under section 32(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 requires a point of law which was involved in the decision and is of general public importance. Those requirements are distinct from whether the point ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.

A proposed question does not satisfy the requirement where it merely reframes a factual assessment or challenges the weight given to particular circumstances. Refusal to certify entails refusal of leave to appeal.

The appellant applied, on the papers, for certification under section 32(4)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003 and for leave to appeal under section 32(4)(b). The application followed the court’s earlier extradition judgment, [2024] EWHC 460 (Admin).

The proposed questions concerned delay and oppression under section 14, the relative assessment of private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, and whether offence seriousness could be assessed independently of the sentence imposed in the requesting state. The central issue was whether these were points of law involved in the earlier decision.

1. Application refused. The court refused certification under section 32(4)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003 and consequently refused leave to appeal under section 32(4)(b).
2. The requirements are distinct and cumulative. There must be a point of law; it must be involved in the decision; and it must be of general public importance. These questions are separate from whether the point ought to be considered by the Supreme Court. The court adopted the basic framework stated in Konczos v Hungary [2022] EWHC 168 (Admin).
3. The first proposed question did not arise from the decision. The earlier judgment had not decided that unexplained delay alone could constitute an exceptional circumstance making extradition oppressive under section 14. It had decided only that the circumstances, including delay, fell far short of the required exceptional level.
4. The second proposed question misstated the reasoning. The earlier judgment assessed the severity of the interference with private life on the particular facts. It did not establish a legal hierarchy between private life and family life.
5. The third proposed question concerned the application of law to facts. The earlier judge had considered both the two-year sentence and the description and seriousness of the offending. The proposed questions therefore were not points of law involved in the decision.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): The earlier extradition judgment was given in [2024] EWHC 460 (Admin). The present court refused certification and leave to appeal.