Monday Ilenotuma v Teaching Regulation Agency & Anor

For a statutory appeal to be brought in time, the appellant must file a compliant appellant’s notice with the required supporting documents and either the appropriate fee or a fee-remission application or certificate. Time continues to run until those defects are remedied.

The court has only a narrow power or duty to extend a statutory appeal period where refusal would impair the very essence of the right of appeal under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The discretion, if engaged, must be exercised only to the minimum extent necessary. Litigants in person remain subject to the ordinary filing requirements, although procedural allowances may be made in appropriate case-management decisions.

The appellant sought an extension of time to appeal against a prohibition order made by the Secretary of State for Education following a Professional Conduct Panel decision of the Teaching Regulation Agency. The order prohibited him from teaching and provided for a two-year review period.

He first lodged papers with the wrong High Court office and later lodged papers with the Administrative Court, but neither filing included the required fee or a fee-remission application or certificate. The perfected documents were filed after expiry of the statutory 28-day period. The central issues were whether an extension was required and whether refusing it would impair the essence of his right of appeal.

1. Extension required. Regulation 17 of the Teachers’ Disciplinary (England) Regulations 2012 imposed a 28-day period from service of the prohibition order. Under CPR 52.12(2) and Practice Direction 52B, the appeal had to be commenced by filing a compliant appellant’s notice accompanied by the appropriate fee or a fee-remission application or certificate, together with the required order or determination. The appellant’s earlier filings were ineffective because they lacked the fee or fee-remission material. Time therefore continued to run until 17 April 2023.
2. Practice Direction 52D stated that the statutory period could not ordinarily be extended. Applying Stuewe, the relevant question was whether refusing an extension would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. If that exceptional jurisdiction arose, the extension had to go no further than necessary to secure Article 6 compliance.
3. The court accepted that time limits and filing fees pursued the legitimate aims of finality, the orderly despatch of judicial business and fairness to respondents. There was a reasonable relationship between those means and those aims. The second limb identified in Tolstoy Miloslavsky was therefore satisfied in any event.
4. Refusal would not impair the essence of the appellant’s right of appeal. The 28-day period was sufficient to discover and satisfy the filing requirements, and the appellant accepted that he could have complied within time had he known what was required. His mistake, lack of representation and reliance on the absence of advice from court staff did not justify a lower standard of compliance. The extension was refused and the out-of-time appeal could not proceed.

The judgment concerns a preliminary application in a statutory appeal against a prohibition order made by the Secretary of State for Education. No prior judicial decision is stated.