Gwladys Fertre v Vale of White Horse District Council

A fresh housing application does not automatically or impliedly abandon an earlier application that is the subject of an extant statutory appeal. A later change in circumstances may make the appeal academic, but the relevant question is whether the appellant retains a legitimate benefit or interest in the outcome.

A future risk of homelessness may constitute a sufficient interest; the benefit need not be immediate or certain, although a merely fanciful possibility is insufficient. The court also retains a discretion to determine an academic appeal where the issue is of substantial public importance. An appeal will not be abusive merely because the appellant pursues an earlier legal challenge while accepting a change in present circumstances.

Ms Fertre appealed under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 against a review decision that she was ineligible for homelessness assistance because of her immigration status and pre-settled status under the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement.

While the appeal was pending, she made a fresh homelessness application, later withdrew the related review application after obtaining supported accommodation, and accepted that she was not presently homeless. The Council applied to strike out the appeal under CPR 52.18, arguing abandonment, abuse of process, lack of interest and academicity.

The central issues were whether the earlier appeal had been abandoned or superseded, whether it had become academic, and whether it should nevertheless continue because of the appellant’s continuing interest or the public importance of the legal issue.

1. The strike-out application was dismissed. The appellant had not expressly abandoned the appeal, and neither the fresh application nor the acceptance that she was no longer presently homeless amounted to unequivocal conduct from which abandonment could be implied.
2. The fresh application did not supersede the earlier application or deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine the section 204 appeal. The proper question was whether subsequent events had made the appeal academic.
3. Continuing the appeal was not an abuse of process. Pursuing a statutory appeal concerning eligibility in 2021 and 2022 remained a legitimate exercise of the statutory right, notwithstanding changed circumstances in 2024.
4. The appeal was not academic. Assuming that the appellant ultimately succeeded on the legal issue, she retained a strong and legitimate interest in an enduring determination of threshold eligibility under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. The risk of future homelessness was real rather than fanciful. The possible reassurance and practical certainty resulting from an eligibility determination were also legitimate benefits.
5. The court could take account of a collateral benefit concerning the appellant’s housing-register position under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996. The prospect that a successful appeal could affect the recognised registration date was sufficiently real to be relevant.
6. Even if the appeal had been academic, the court would have exercised its discretion to permit it to continue because the issue concerning pre-settled status and eligibility had considerable public importance and wider implications for Union citizens, welfare benefits and public authorities.
7. The applications of the Secretary of State, The3Million Ltd and the Independent Monitoring Authority to intervene were granted. The parties were directed to agree arrangements for written and oral submissions.

The judgment concerns an interlocutory strike-out application in a statutory appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996. The substantive appeal remained listed for hearing in June 2024. The substitution of the respondent had previously been determined by the High Court in [2024] EWHC 112 (KB).