HRH Princess Deema Bint Sultan Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud v Ronald William Gibbs

A debarring order must be given its precise effect. Where a defendant is debarred from defending proceedings, the defendant ordinarily cannot adduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or make submissions challenging liability or quantum. The court retains a narrow residual discretion to permit participation on genuinely limited matters, such as the scope of the pleaded claim or the form of the final order. That discretion must not undermine compliance with case-management orders. A debarring order does not, however, entitle the claimant to judgment automatically: the claimant must still prove entitlement to the relief sought.

The claimant brought proceedings concerning assets and sums said to be due under a 2018 Settlement Agreement. Following failures to comply with payment and disclosure orders, Dias J made unless orders debarring the defendant from defending the proceedings. Permission to appeal was refused. The defendant later applied to participate at trial and to summon two witnesses for cross-examination, seeking to defend both liability and quantum. He also sought permission to advance an unpleaded counterclaim.

The central issues were the effect of the debarring order, the scope of the court’s residual power to permit limited participation, and whether the proposed counterclaim could be raised.

1. Application to defend dismissed. The order made by Dias J clearly debarred the defendant from defending the proceedings altogether. Its effect was not confined to preventing the advancement of a positive defence.
2. Applying the approach summarised in Times Travel v Pakistan International Airline Group [2019] EWHC 3732 (Ch), approved in Hirachand v Hirachand [2021] EWCA Civ 1498 and applied in Kim v Lee [2021] EWHC 231 QB, a defendant debarred from defending should not ordinarily adduce evidence, cross-examine the claimant’s witnesses, or make submissions in defence. The prohibition covers challenges to the cogency of factual and expert evidence and applies equally to liability and quantum.
3. The court retains a narrow residual discretion or trial-management power. It may permit submissions on genuinely discrete matters, such as whether proposed relief exceeds the pleaded claim, the form of order after the substantive decision, or costs. That power must preserve the practical and disciplinary effect of the debarring order.
4. The defendant’s proposed participation was not limited in that way. He sought to reargue the merits, challenge the claimant’s evidence, and revisit matters already determined. His application could not be used to overturn or disregard the debarring order.
5. The claimant was still required to prove the claim and entitlement to damages; the debarring order did not produce an automatic default judgment.
6. Permission to advance the proposed counterclaim was refused. The claims were late, unparticularised and unpleaded, lacked an identified legal basis, fell within the debarring order, and in part concerned a person who was no longer a party.