Thomas Ward v The Chief of Greater Manchester Police

Permission to bring proceedings under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 329, requires evidence giving the claim a real prospect of establishing either that the statutory condition is not met or that the defendant’s act was grossly disproportionate. The application is not a vehicle for resolving disputed evidence or conducting a mini-trial. Gross disproportionality must be assessed in all the circumstances, without undue emphasis on the resulting injury. Deliberately ordering or deliberately allowing a police dog to continue biting a suspect after detention may satisfy the test. A fleeing suspect is not necessarily owed no duty of care where positive force is deployed or where there is a failure to stop that force.

The claimant sought permission under section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to bring trespass and potentially negligence proceedings against the Chief Constable. He alleged that a police dog seriously injured his leg during his arrest after a police pursuit.

The sequence of events was disputed. The claimant said he was detained and handcuffed before the dog bit him, and that no warning of the dog was given. The defendant’s evidence was that the dog detained him while he was still fleeing and was released after a warning. The central issues were whether the claim had a real prospect of satisfying section 329 and whether the evidence could properly be rejected without a trial.

1. Permission granted. The claimant was given permission under section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to bring the trespass claim.
2. The relevant evidential standard was whether the claim had a real prospect of success, including a real prospect of proving that the statutory condition was not met or that the force was grossly disproportionate. The application should be approached similarly to reverse summary judgment and should not become a mini-trial.
3. There was a real prospect of establishing that the dog was deliberately ordered to bite, or deliberately allowed to continue biting, after the claimant had been detained and handcuffed. On the claimant’s case, that would amount to grossly disproportionate force. The disputed sequence of events could not be resolved summarily.
4. There was also a real prospect of establishing that the absence of a warning that a police dog would be released was grossly disproportionate. Whether it was grossly disproportionate depended on the circumstances, including the timing of any warning and the relative positions of the officers and the claimant.
5. In assessing gross disproportionality, the court had to consider all the circumstances and avoid placing undue weight on the severity of the injury. The court also had to allow for the practical difficulty of measuring precisely the force necessary for a legitimate purpose.
6. For present purposes, a negligent failure to control or release the dog could potentially give rise to a claim. Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester did not establish that a fleeing suspect could never be owed a duty of care where positive force was used or where there was a failure to stop that force.
7. The claimant’s case concerning the honesty of the officer’s belief also had a real prospect of success, although it was unnecessary to determine that issue independently once permission was granted.