Maria El Massouri v Omani Estates Limited

On the proper construction of leases, an attic space may fall outside a demise of a second-floor flat while falling within a separate demise of an area situated above the second floor. The wording of each lease must be considered in its contractual and physical context, including the plans and the intended accommodation.

An estoppel based on possession and works undertaken in the capacity of tenant may cease when the relevant lease, including any extension or continuation, ends. An order between two leaseholders should not determine the rights of a freeholder who was not a party to the proceedings.

The judgment concerned the form of order following the court’s earlier findings in [2024] EWHC 534 (Ch). The dispute was between the claimant, proprietor of a lease of a second-floor flat, and the defendant, proprietor of a separate lease concerning accommodation above the second floor.

The court had to determine whether an attic space above a bathroom on the half-landing formed part of the defendant’s demise, and whether the proposed order should state that the defendant’s estoppel continued only while the claimant’s leasehold rights continued. The freeholder was not a party.

1. Construction of the claimant’s lease. The demise of the second-floor flat, including the ceilings and floors and half the width of the supporting joists or beams, did not include the attic space above the bathroom on the half-landing. The bathroom had a ceiling attached to joists or beams, so the area above it was excluded from the claimant’s demise.
2. Construction of the Frimpong Lease. The attic was included in the defendant’s demise. The lease covered an area situated above the second floor, including the ceilings and floors of the proposed flat and the joists and beams on which the floors were laid. The second floor was understood to include the stairs and half-landing, and the 1982 plans showed that the attic was intended to form part of the proposed flat.
3. Estoppel. Although the attic formed part of the Frimpong Lease, it was also within the area of the claimant’s adverse possession. On the facts previously found, the defendant was estopped from challenging the claimant’s possession while the claimant and her husband remained in possession in their character as tenants under the claimant’s lease. That estoppel and the associated unconscionability ceased when the claimant’s lease, including any extension or continuation or statutory tenancy pursuant to Part 1 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, came to an end.
4. Limits of the order. The proceedings determined only the position between the claimant and the defendant. Since the freeholder was not a party, the court made no finding on whether the defendant’s rights were extinguished because the claimant’s possession was to be treated as the freeholder’s possession. The order was settled accordingly, with the remaining terms and costs provisions unchanged.

The judgment was a first-instance decision concerning the form of order following the court’s earlier judgment in [2024] EWHC 534 (Ch). It did not determine an appeal.