Emilia Idziak v Merlin Entertainments PLC

An appellate court should be slow to interfere with a case-management decision. That restraint does not excuse a failure to give intelligible reasons. Where a judge permits some pleading amendments but refuses others, the judgment must explain the material distinction between them and must show how the relevant considerations, including novelty, delay, prejudice and procedural fairness, were assessed. If the reasoning is so opaque that neither party can understand the basis of the outcome, the decision may be unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity. The proper course may be to set aside the amendment decision in its entirety and remit the application for reconsideration.

The claimant brought a damages claim arising from injuries allegedly sustained on a fairground roller-coaster ride. Following a retrial order by Jacobs J after an earlier County Court judgment was successfully appealed, both parties applied to amend their pleadings.

HHJ Maloney permitted amendments concerning the ride’s speed sensors but refused amendments concerning a blown brake airline. Both parties sought permission to appeal. The central issue was whether the judge’s reasoning adequately explained the different treatment of the proposed amendments and properly addressed novelty, delay, prejudice and the procedural history.

1. Permission and appeals. Permission to appeal was granted to both parties. Under CPR 52.6, permission required a real prospect of success or another compelling reason. Under CPR 52.21, an appeal could succeed where the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity. A case-management discretion was broad, and appellate intervention on its merits required considerable hesitation.
2. Failure of reasoning. The amendment judgment identified novelty, delay and timetable concerns, but did not apply the relevant approach to late amendments or explain why those concerns justified permitting the speed-sensor amendments while refusing the airline amendments. It did not analyse whether the proposed matters were merely particulars of existing allegations or entirely new heads of negligence and causation. The judgment’s logic was therefore elusive and could not be reconstructed by speculation.
3. Effect of the defect. The failure to explain the differential outcome vitiated the judgment as a whole. Neither party could understand why it had succeeded or failed to the extent it did. The decision was set aside in its entirety insofar as it concerned amendments to the particulars of claim.
4. Remittal. The claimant’s application was remitted to the County Court for determination on its merits under CPR 17.3, in the context of the overall case management of the retrial. The imminent trial could not proceed and fresh directions would be required.
5. Guidance. The court identified, without expressing a view on the merits, the need to consider the scope of the original pleadings, the evolution of the parties’ cases, the significance of the blown airline evidence, each party’s responsibility for delay, the effect of previous appeals and whether the amendments remained late once considered before a trial date was fixed. Costs of the appeals were provisionally to be reserved to the trial judge.

• County Court at Cambridge: Judgment was entered for the claimant after trial on 14 June 2022.
• Appeal before Jacobs J: The defendant’s appeal was allowed on 28 June 2023 and the claim was ordered to be retried.
• County Court at Cambridge: HHJ Maloney permitted amendments concerning the speed sensors but refused amendments concerning the brake airline.
• High Court (King’s Bench Division): Both appeals were allowed. The amendment decision was set aside in its entirety insofar as it concerned the particulars of claim, and the claimant’s application was remitted for reconsideration.