Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v Mason Phelps

For civil contempt arising from breach of an injunction, the claimant must prove service of the order and a deliberate act which breached it to the criminal standard. Where alternative service has been authorised and complied with, the claimant need not additionally prove the defendant’s personal awareness of the injunction.

The defendant’s actual state of knowledge is relevant to mitigation and penalty, not liability. A requirement for personal knowledge cannot be added to the prescribed service regime. The obligation to maintain alternative-service signage means reasonably maintaining it, assessed in the context of all the other methods of publicity and the practical circumstances.

The claimant local authorities obtained an interim injunction prohibiting car cruising in the Black Country. The injunction was amended to prohibit drivers, riders and passengers from participating in gatherings involving motor racing, motor stunts or dangerous or obstructive driving.

The Third Claimant applied to commit the Defendant for contempt after police observed him driving at speed and overtaking and undertaking other vehicles on Kenrick Way. The issues were whether the injunction had been served despite two road signs later being missing, whether personal knowledge was required, and whether the Defendant’s driving breached the injunction.

The court also determined the appropriate penalty after finding the contempt proved.

1. Service and proof. Civil contempt remains civil in nature, but the claimant must prove the elements beyond reasonable doubt. The Amended Interim Injunction had been served in accordance with the alternative-service provisions. The obligation to maintain road signs required reasonable maintenance, not an absolute guarantee that every sign would remain continuously in place. The missing signs had been displayed at some point after the required publicity and were removed during a period of no more than five weeks. The wider publicity, including media, websites, social media and other signage, was also relevant.
2. Personal knowledge. The Defendant’s reliance on P v P (Contempt of Court: Mental Capacity) was rejected insofar as it suggested that personal awareness of the injunction was an additional requirement. The later Court of Appeal authorities, particularly Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean, established that notice is equivalent to service. Once service has been proved, there is no further requirement to prove personal knowledge of the order.
3. The Defendant’s state of knowledge remained relevant to penalty. The burden of establishing lack of personal knowledge rested on him on the balance of probabilities, because it was a matter within his peculiar knowledge and concerned mitigation rather than a constituent element of contempt. His evidence was rejected, and the court found that he knew of the injunction in any event.
4. The driving was deliberate and fell within motor racing and dangerous or obstructive driving prohibited by the injunction. The court found the required gathering, location and time established, but did not find that the driving amounted to a motor stunt. Civil contempt was therefore proved.
5. Penalty. Applying Lovett v Wigan Borough Council and the Civil Justice Council matrix by analogy, the court assessed culpability as medium and harm as category 2 at the higher end. It imposed 42 days’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months subject to compliance with the injunction and subsequent amendments. The Defendant was ordered to pay the claimant’s costs of £7,040.30, payable within three months, subject to any later application for instalments.

The judgment was a first-instance determination of a contempt application. The Defendant had previously been produced before Martin Spencer J, who gave case-management directions, and the matter proceeded to trial before Her Honour Judge Emma Kelly. No appellate decision is stated.