LBA v Governors of St Hugh of Lincoln RC Primary School & Anor

A satisfied judgment bars a subsequent claim against another tortfeasor only where both are liable for the same damage. The rule does not automatically apply where the alleged tortfeasors are independent, their legal liabilities differ, and the pleaded assaults or losses may concern different damage.

On a strike-out application under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 3.4(2)(a), the court must be satisfied that the claim is bound to fail. Where the effect and scope of a consent order depend on disputed allegations and the allocation of liability between different tortfeasors, those issues may properly be left for trial.

The claimant alleged sexual abuse by a priest during school hours and at weekends. He first brought proceedings against the Bishop of Salford, alleging vicarious liability for the priest’s assaults. Those proceedings ended in a consent order requiring payment of £35,000 in full and final settlement of the claim against the Bishop.

The claimant subsequently sued the school governors and the local authority, alleging negligence and breach of a non-delegable duty in permitting the priest to take him from school despite concerns about the priest’s conduct. The defendants applied to strike out the claim, arguing that the satisfied consent order fixed the claimant’s loss and barred proceedings against concurrent tortfeasors liable for the same damage.

1. The application to strike out the claim under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 3.4(2)(a), was dismissed. The defendants had not shown that the claim was bound to fail.
2. The general rule is that satisfaction of a judgment bars a further claim against another tortfeasor liable for the same damage. That principle applies to concurrent tortfeasors, but it depends on the damage being the same.
3. Vanden Recycling v Tumulty (2017) CP Rep 33 was distinguishable. In that case the defendants were alleged to have acted in concert, and the claims concerned the same damage. Here, the alleged liabilities of the Bishop and the defendants had different legal bases. The defendants were independent tortfeasors and were arguably liable for different damage arising from different assaults.
4. The consent order did not necessarily fix the claimant’s entire loss. Its wording referred to settlement of the claim for damages and costs against the Bishop. The claimant’s allegations against the Bishop had not progressed to detailed Particulars of Claim, and the order could reasonably be understood as addressing the weekend abuse while leaving the school abuse to be pursued against the defendants.
5. The court relied on the approach described in IXA v Scout Association [2018] EWHC 1821 (QB): where the precise scope of allegations and liability cannot fairly be determined without evidence, the distinction should ordinarily be left to the trial judge. The application was therefore dismissed.