National Highways Limited v Callum Goodie & Anor

Contempt of court requires proof to the criminal standard that the defendant had notice of the order, deliberately performed the prohibited act, intended to do so, and knew the facts making the act a breach. Actual knowledge of the injunction and its material terms concerns sanction rather than liability, and the defendant bears the civil burden of proving its absence. A defendant may technically breach an injunction without penalty where absence of actual knowledge is established. The court may continue contempt proceedings in a defendant’s absence, but the power must be exercised with great caution.

National Highways Limited sought committal orders against Callum Goode and Tez Burns for alleged breaches of a precautionary injunction restraining persons associated with the Just Stop Oil protest group from trespassing on M25 structures. The proceedings had been adjourned after both defendants were taken into custody following a protest at the Royal Courts of Justice. Tez Burns did not attend the resumed hearing, while Callum Goode attended in person.

The court first considered whether to proceed in Burns’s absence and whether to issue a bench warrant. It then determined liability and the defendants’ actual knowledge of the injunction. The central issues were whether the elements of contempt were proved and whether either defendant had established absence of knowledge sufficient to avoid sanction.

1. Proceeding in absence. The court proceeded against Tez Burns in their absence and declined to issue a bench warrant. Under [2021] EWHC 1735 (Admin), the power to continue contempt proceedings in a defendant’s absence exists but must be exercised with great caution. The court was satisfied that Burns knew of the hearing date and attendance requirement, had been duly served with the adjournment order, and had deliberately chosen not to attend. The evidence was substantially complete, and the court retained the ability to revisit the decision if prejudice emerged.
2. Liability. Contempt by disobedience of an order required proof to the criminal standard that each defendant had received notice of the order, had performed an act prohibited by it, intended to perform that act, and knew the facts which made the act a breach. Those ingredients were established in both cases. Each defendant had been served by an authorised alternative method, deliberately entered and remained on an M25 gantry, and knew the factual circumstances of the conduct. No application had been made to set aside the alternative-service order.
3. Knowledge and sanction. Actual knowledge of the injunction and its material terms was relevant to sanction rather than liability. The burden was on each defendant to establish absence of knowledge on the civil standard. Having assessed the evidence, the court accepted that both defendants honestly lacked knowledge of the Chamberlain Order. Burns’s prior service of a different injunction did not establish knowledge of the Chamberlain Order, and the court declined to determine liability or knowledge under that separate order.
4. Both defendants had therefore acted in technical breach, but absence of actual knowledge meant that no penalty should be imposed in either case. The contempt applications resulted in no sanction.