Birmingham City Council v Daniel Gordon & Anor

Contempt of an injunction must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In sentencing for breach of an injunction, the court should assess culpability and harm, consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and give primary weight to securing future compliance, followed by punishment and rehabilitation. The Lovett approach may be applied by analogy in civil contempt proceedings. Mental disorders or conditions reduce culpability only where there is sufficient connection with the offending behaviour; they may nevertheless constitute general mitigation. Risk of harm is relevant even where no actual injury occurred. A deliberate and serious breach may justify custody, but suspension is ordinarily considered as a means of securing compliance where appropriate.

Birmingham City Council applied to commit Mr Daniel Gordon and Mr Joseph Dawson for contempt arising from their admitted breach of a final anti-street-cruising injunction. The defendants admitted removing traffic cones to facilitate street-cruising and briefly entering a vehicle participating in the street-cruise. They did not challenge service.

The court determined whether contempt had been proved and, if so, the appropriate sentences. It also considered the relevance of Mr Gordon’s reported medical and developmental conditions, the level of harm and culpability, suspension of imprisonment, and costs.

1. Contempt proved. The claimant bore the criminal burden of proof. The admissions, police evidence and video footage established beyond reasonable doubt that each defendant breached paragraph 1 of the injunction by helping to reopen a closed carriageway and participating, at least momentarily, as a passenger in a vehicle involved in a street-cruise (paras 19–22).
2. Sentencing approach. The court adopted the approach used in earlier breaches and applied by analogy the guidance in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, as endorsed in Birmingham City Council v Lloyd [2023] EWCA Civ 1355. The primary objective was future compliance, followed by punishment and rehabilitation (paras 23–27).
3. Culpability and harm. The breach was deliberate and fell within category B, but did not reach the threshold between categories A and B. The harm was category 2, at the upper end. The court considered both actual harm and the substantial risk created by enabling high-speed racing on a public road (paras 30–33).
4. Mental conditions and mitigation. Mr Gordon’s reported conditions did not reduce culpability because he knew that removing the cones was wrong. They remained relevant to general mitigation. Both defendants’ good character, first breach, remorse and stated intention to comply were mitigating factors (paras 25–29, 34–40).
5. Sentence and costs. A fine or deferred consideration would be insufficient. Each defendant received 35 days’ imprisonment, reduced to 23 days for full credit for admissions, suspended for 12 months on condition of compliance with the injunction. Each defendant was ordered to pay £2,024.30 in costs by instalments: £100 per month for Mr Gordon and £50 per month for Mr Dawson (paras 41–47).

First-instance decision. The defendants were informed that an appeal against the suspended committal orders lay to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) within 21 days.