Logan Jackson, Re

When setting the minimum term for a life prisoner transferred to England and Wales, the High Court must first assess the term that would have been imposed domestically under Sentencing Act 2020 and Schedule 21. It must then consider the likely period of actual imprisonment in the transferring state. Where the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons applies, the domestic term must be adapted, where necessary, to correspond as closely as possible to that likely period. The court must not simply adopt the point at which the prisoner first becomes eligible to apply for parole in the transferring state. The assessment must consider the likely outcome of the parole process, including the seriousness of the offending and other statutory factors. The judicially determined minimum term must be reduced by qualifying time spent on remand.

The Secretary of State referred the case under section 273 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 after Logan Jackson, a UK citizen, was transferred from the Republic of Ireland to England and Wales to serve the remainder of an Irish life sentence.

He had been convicted in Dublin of murder and reckless endangerment arising from repeatedly driving a car over a victim. The Irish court imposed life imprisonment for murder and a concurrent seven-year sentence for reckless endangerment, but did not specify a minimum term.

The court had to determine the minimum term applicable in England and Wales, taking account of the domestic sentencing framework and the obligation under the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons to preserve parity with the sentence that would have been enforced in Ireland.

1. Domestic assessment. Applying sections 321 and 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and Schedule 21, the appropriate starting point for the murder, committed when the offender was aged 29, was 15 years. The higher 25-year starting point in paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 did not apply because the car, although used as a weapon, had not been taken to the scene with the intention of using it to commit an offence.
2. The repeated use of the vehicle, the victim’s suffering before death, intoxication, the public circumstances of the offence and the associated reckless endangerment materially aggravated the offending. The offender’s previous convictions did not constitute a significant further aggravating feature. Lack of premeditation and lack of intent to kill did not materially reduce the term. The domestic minimum term, allowing for both offences, would have been 22 years.
3. Transfer principles. Under the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, as considered in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Read, the United Kingdom had adopted enforcement and adaptation rather than conversion of transferred sentences. Following Hull and the approach reviewed in Antar, the court had to estimate how long the prisoner would probably have remained in custody in Ireland before release on parole, rather than use the date on which he first became eligible to apply.
4. The first review after 12 years under sections 24(1)(a) and 24(10) of the Parole Act 2019 did not make 12 years the appropriate minimum term. The Parole Board would have had to consider the gravity of the murder, use of the car as a weapon, the associated offence and the offender’s history. The current Irish average for life prisoners was 19 years, and the aggravating features made a longer period likely. The 22-year domestic term therefore did not require reduction to preserve parity.
5. Applying R v Cookson, the precise determination of the minimum term was a judicial function. The 22-year term had to be reduced by 903 days spent on remand. The court ordered a minimum term of 19 years and 192 days’ imprisonment, calculated from 21 December 2019, before the early-release provisions could apply.