Richard D Hall v Martin Hibbert & Anor

A court may grant summary judgment on discrete issues where the opposing party has no real prospect of success and no other compelling reason requires a trial. The procedure remains compatible with the right to a fair trial where the party has notice, an opportunity to adduce evidence and a fair opportunity to make submissions.

Under section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, a subsisting criminal conviction is admissible to prove the offence and the convicted person is taken to have committed it unless the contrary is proved. A conviction may therefore place an evidential burden on the opposing party. Evidence consisting only of speculation, commentary or inadmissible opinion cannot establish a realistic prospect of success.

Richard D Hall sought renewed permission to appeal after Steyn J refused permission on the papers. The application concerned Master Davison’s summary judgment for Martin Hibbert and Eve Hibbert on four issues arising from their claims in harassment, misuse of private information and data protection.

The issues concerned whether the Manchester Arena bombing occurred, whether the respondents were present, whether they suffered the alleged injuries, and whether those injuries were caused by the bombing. Hall argued that section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 had been misapplied, that the summary judgment test had not been properly applied, and that he had been denied a fair trial.

1. Application dismissed. The renewed application for permission to appeal was without merit and an appeal would have no realistic prospect of success.
2. Master Davison had correctly treated the four issues as suitable for summary determination under CPR Part 24. Summary judgment may determine issues where the relevant party has no prospects of success, allowing the trial to focus on matters properly in dispute. That procedure did not infringe the appellant’s right to a fair trial because he had notice, adduced a lengthy witness statement and exhibits, and had a fair opportunity to make written and oral submissions.
3. Section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 was correctly applied. Hashem Abedi’s subsisting convictions for murder and attempted murder, arising from a joint enterprise with Salman Abedi, were relevant to whether the bombing occurred and whether the respondents were injured by it. The convictions were admissible and constituted weighty evidence. The appellant therefore had to show a realistic prospect of success on the issues.
4. The appellant’s material consisted principally of personal commentary, speculation and opinions. His medical views were inadmissible because he was not medically qualified, and the material did not establish a credible case capable of displacing the effect of the convictions and the respondents’ evidence. The possibility that disclosure might reveal evidence supporting the alleged hoax was far-fetched.
5. The Master was entitled not to engage in detail with evidence that could not establish any real prospect of success. Steyn J’s refusal of permission was upheld.

• High Court, King's Bench Division — The renewed application for permission to appeal was dismissed.
• High Court — Steyn J refused permission to appeal on the papers on 15 April 2024.
• High Court — Master Davison granted summary judgment for the respondents on four issues. The citation of that judgment was not stated in the judgment.