Jones Nickolds Limited v Ian Pearce

For an interim non-disclosure injunction, the court must be satisfied that the claimant is likely to establish at trial a right to protection against disclosure and that continuation of the injunction is just, convenient and proportionate. The strict threshold in section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 applies.

Confidential and legally privileged information sent inadvertently may give rise to a duty of confidence where the recipient knows, or it is clear from the circumstances, that the information was sent in error. An anonymity order may protect a non-party where publicity would defeat the purpose of the proceedings and the order is necessary for the proper administration of justice.

Jones Nickolds Limited, a family law firm, sought continuation of an interim non-disclosure injunction granted by Goose J on 25 March 2024. The injunction concerned an email sent inadvertently to Ian Pearce which contained confidential and legally privileged information belonging to another client, referred to as AA.

Pearce did not attend the return-date hearing but had received adequate notice and provided written representations. JNL also sought an anonymity order and reporting restrictions for AA, an order requiring further information about disclosures already made, and permission to serve documents by email. The central issues were whether the interim protection should continue and whether the ancillary relief was justified.

The court granted the relief sought by Jones Nickolds Limited and continued the interim non-disclosure injunction until trial or further order.

1. The court was satisfied that JNL was likely to establish at trial that the email was plainly confidential, contained legally privileged information, and came into Pearce’s possession in circumstances making the inadvertent transmission and confidential nature clear. Those circumstances were sufficient to support a duty of confidence owed by Pearce to JNL.
2. Pearce’s statements and conduct, including messages posted on X, amounted to an express or implied threat to disclose the email or information within it without consent. The court was also likely to reject the proposed public interest defence. A fair reading of the email did not support the alleged sinister interpretation, and the limited apparent association between AA and the Panama Papers scandal added no real support to that defence.
3. Applying the strict test in section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, continuation of the injunction was just, convenient and proportionate.
4. An anonymity order and related reporting restrictions were necessary to protect JNL and AA’s interests and to secure the proper administration of justice. The injunction alone did not sufficiently address the uncertainty surrounding references to AA’s identity during the proceedings. The court considered that it had power to make the order even though AA was not a party.
5. The order for further information was mandatory relief. The section 12(2) threshold was nevertheless satisfied, and the information was necessary to enable JNL to notify the relevant recipients and minimise the risk of further disclosure or misuse.
6. Service by email was permitted because it was the more certain method of communication and was, in substance, Pearce’s preferred and accepted method. Costs were reserved.

The judgment records that Goose J granted an interim non-disclosure injunction on 25 March 2024. At the return-date hearing, the High Court continued that injunction and granted related ancillary relief.