Christine Pratt & Anor, R (on the application of) v Exeter City Council

A planning authority must assess and weigh the effects of a proposed access scheme on existing residents where access, amenity and highway convenience are material considerations. It cannot defer those matters to a later traffic regulation order process.

Where objections identify a material gap in the evidence, the authority must make reasonable further inquiries before deciding the application. A planning officer’s report is unlawful if it materially misleads the committee, including by misstating the availability or legal feasibility of alternative access arrangements. A Grampian condition may provide a lawful alternative to a condition requiring works on third-party land.

The claimants sought judicial review of Exeter City Council’s grant of outline planning permission for up to 350 dwellings at St Bridget Nursery, Exeter. The approved access scheme involved partial closure and a one-way system on Old Rydon Lane.

The claimants argued that the Council had failed to assess the scheme’s effects on existing residents and had failed to investigate whether an alternative access route through third-party land was available. The Council conceded those errors and accepted that the permission should be quashed. The interested party contested Grounds 1 and 2. Grounds 3 and 4 fell away.

1. Ground 1 succeeded. The Council was required by section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act to have regard to the development plan. The relevant policies required consideration of local amenity and the safety and convenience of the road network. The availability of access to existing homes, including loss of amenity, was also an obviously material consideration.
2. The Council had to assess and weigh matters including increased or circuitous journeys, inconvenience to residents, mitigation, and access for public and emergency services. The officer’s reports failed to address those matters. The Council could not leave them to Devon County Council’s later traffic regulation order process, because they had to be considered before planning permission was granted.
3. The Council breached its Tameside duty. The objections put it on notice of a material evidential gap, and no reasonable planning authority could have been satisfied that it possessed the information necessary to decide the application without further inquiries of the applicant and highways authority.
4. Ground 2 succeeded. The Newcourt Masterplan was an obviously material consideration because it identified and helped deliver an access strategy for the site. The officer’s reports failed to explain the weight to be given to the significant departure from that strategy.
5. The advice that conditions requiring use of third-party land could not be imposed was materially misleading because a Grampian condition could prohibit development until specified access works had been completed, subject to the relevant prospects of performance. The advice that the alternative land would cost one third of the development value lacked evidential support. The Council also failed to investigate whether the land was available and, if so, its asking price.
6. Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not apply. The Council had to reconsider the application lawfully and exercise its planning judgment afresh. The planning permission was quashed.