Birmingham City Council v Raaghib Afsar & Anor

For contempt of an injunction restraining street cruising, the court must sentence to secure future compliance, punish the breach and promote rehabilitation. Culpability and harm are assessed by reference both to harm caused and to harm intended or risked. Deliberate high-speed racing on an urban public highway may justify immediate custody where a fine or deferred consideration would be insufficient. A custodial sentence may be suspended, usually as the first means of securing compliance with the underlying order, particularly where the contemnor has made early admissions and has a good character. A breach during the suspension period may ordinarily lead to activation of the suspended sentence in addition to punishment for the further breach.

Birmingham City Council obtained a final injunction restraining persons unknown from participating in street cruises within Birmingham. The defendants admitted that, on 19 May 2024, they drove powerful cars at speeds substantially above the speed limit and raced each other on public roads. They accepted that their conduct amounted to participation in a prohibited street cruise and breached paragraph 1 of the injunction. The admissions were made after legal advice and were accepted by the Council. The court therefore determined the contempt applications and proceeded to sentence each defendant.

1. Each defendant’s admitted conduct constituted contempt of the injunction. The conduct involved racing at speed on a public highway, causing nuisance and creating an obvious danger to other road users and a risk of damage to private property. The claimant bore the burden of proving contempt to the criminal standard.

2. The sentencing objectives were future compliance with the injunction, punishment and rehabilitation. The court adopted by analogy the guidance in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, noting that the approach had been endorsed in Birmingham City Council v Lloyd [2023] EWCA Civ 1355.

3. The breaches fell within culpability category B and harm category 2. In assessing harm, the court considered both harm actually caused and harm intended or at risk of being caused. Driving at 70–80 miles per hour while racing in an urban area created an obvious risk of serious harm and placed the case at the top end of category 2. The starting point was one month’s imprisonment, with a range up to three months.

4. Although there were mitigating features, including youth, good character, employment, apologies and admissions, neither deferred consideration nor a fine would provide a sufficient penalty. Only custody could reflect the seriousness of the breaches. The appropriate sentence before credit was 42 days’ imprisonment for each defendant.

5. Each defendant received maximum one-third credit for an admission at the first opportunity. The resulting 28-day sentence was suspended for 12 months on condition of compliance with the injunction or any amended version. A further breach would ordinarily place the defendant at risk of activation of the suspended sentence in addition to sentence for the new breach.

6. Each defendant was ordered to pay the Council’s costs of £693 by instalments of £200 per month. The order reflected the general rule in CPR 44.2(2) that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs.