A v M & Ors

A step-parent’s application for parental responsibility is determined under the child-welfare paramountcy principle. The factors identified in Re H (Parental Responsibility) provide a non-exhaustive starting point: commitment, attachment and the reasons for applying. The court must also recognise that parental responsibility is a legal status involving duties and responsibilities owed primarily to the child, not merely a mechanism for securing contact or residence. A parental responsibility order may appropriately recognise an established psychological parent-child relationship, even where the applicant is not biologically related to the child. The child’s wishes, feelings and developing autonomy may justify different outcomes for siblings. The practical possibility of parental responsibility being used to create conflict is relevant, but does not justify refusal where the applicant’s conduct is child-focused and the order is likely to protect or reassure the child.

The applicant, A, was the mother’s husband and had lived in New Zealand with the mother and her two children, D and K. A had obtained a New Zealand guardianship order in respect of D and had acted as K’s father throughout her life, although he was not her biological father. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother removed D and K to the United Kingdom to live with their maternal aunt, following Hague Convention proceedings.

A applied under section 4A(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989 for parental responsibility in respect of both children. The central issues were whether the orders were in each child’s welfare interests, having regard to A’s commitment and attachment, the children’s wishes and feelings, their developing autonomy, and the possible practical consequences of conferring parental responsibility.

1. Outcome. The application was granted in respect of K and refused in respect of D.
2. Under section 4A(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, the application was governed by the paramountcy principle in section 1(1). The factors identified in Re H (Parental Responsibility)—the applicant’s commitment, attachment and reasons for applying—were a non-exhaustive starting point, not a prescriptive checklist. The court was required to evaluate the individual child’s welfare in the circumstances of the case.
3. Parental responsibility is a question of legal status, distinct from section 8 orders concerning arrangements for the child. It carries rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority, but those responsibilities are to be understood primarily as owed to the child. The status may be significant in future decisions concerning the child and may recognise the reality of an established parental role.
4. For D, A had shown commitment and had occupied a paternal role, but D’s consistently expressed resistance to the order, his wish to regain autonomy after a traumatic removal, and the limited additional effect the order would have on their relationship meant that making it would be inconsistent with his welfare.
5. For K, A had been the only father she had known, had shown lengthy and instinctive commitment, and remained a significant figure in her history and developing identity. The order would reflect that status and reassure K that A’s commitment had continued. A’s child-focused conduct and support for K’s relationship with her biological father meant that the order was unlikely to create practical complications. It could instead provide additional protection if the children were again removed unilaterally.

The judgment records that the Hague Convention proceedings had been withdrawn with permission. A previous judgment by a Deputy High Court Judge declined to recognise A’s parental responsibility in respect of either child and made directions for the children to spend time with him. An appeal from that decision had been adjourned generally pending determination of this application.