Jonathan Andrew Williams, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice

The Secretary of State is the primary decision-maker on the categorisation and transfer of prisoners. The Secretary of State may reject a Parole Board recommendation provided the decision has a rational basis and shows proper engagement with the Board’s assessment.

The intensity of reasoning required depends on the issue. More cogent and detailed reasons are required where the Board had a particular advantage, such as hearing oral evidence or applying specialist expertise. Less intense reasoning may suffice for predictive assessments and judgments involving public interest considerations, although reasons remain necessary. A decision letter need not provide a point-by-point rebuttal.

The claimant, an indeterminate sentence prisoner, sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s rejection of a Parole Board recommendation that he be transferred from closed to open prison conditions.

The Board had assessed him as a low risk of absconding if he continued to use his skills and had considered a period in open conditions essential. The Secretary of State disagreed, relying on evidence of impulsive and erratic behaviour, abscond risk, and the availability of greater structure and support in closed conditions.

The central issue was whether the decision gave adequate reasons for departing from the Board’s recommendation.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Secretary of State was the primary decision-maker and was entitled to adopt a policy governing transfers to open conditions. The Parole Board’s recommendation was advice and was not binding. The Secretary of State nevertheless had to take account of the Board’s expertise and give reasons showing rational engagement with its assessment: R (Banfield) v Secretary of State for Justice [2007] EWHC 2605 (Admin); R (on the application of Gilbert) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] EWCA Civ 802.

2. The required intensity of reasoning lies on a continuum. The court must identify whether the Board had a particular advantage on the issue. Issues closely connected with past factual findings, oral evidence, credibility or specialist evaluation may require very good reasons for departure. More predictive or policy-related assessments permit less intense reasoning, although the Secretary of State must still explain the contrary conclusion. There is no bright-line division between fact and risk assessment: R (Oakley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2022] EWHC 2602 (Admin); R (Overton) v Secretary of State for Justice [2023] EWHC 3071 (Admin).

3. The decision letter was to be read fairly and as a whole. It need not criticise the recommendation point by point. It was sufficient that it identified the relevant issues, recognised the Board’s view, and explained why the Secretary of State reached a different conclusion.

4. The Board’s assessment of abscond risk was predictive and conditional. The dossier reasonably supported the Secretary of State’s different interpretation, particularly in light of the evidence of impulsive and erratic behaviour and the assessed risk of serious harm. The decision adequately explained why the condition on which the Board’s assessment depended might not be fulfilled. Very good reasons were therefore unnecessary; in any event, the reasons were sufficient even on that higher standard.

5. The Secretary of State also adequately explained why there was no wholly persuasive case for transfer. PIPE or Progression Regime support was unavailable in open conditions, and the claimant’s difficulties in group environments and impulsive behaviour indicated a need for greater structure. The two criteria were closely connected, but the decision was not founded merely on the existence of an additional criterion not considered by the Board.

6. An internal proforma may inform and amplify the reasons in a decision where it was before the decision-maker and materially formed part of the preparatory work, although it does not itself constitute the decision.