The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Richmond v Alistair Trotman

Committal for civil contempt requires clear and unambiguous terms, proper notice, and proof of breach beyond reasonable doubt. The court applies the principle of doubtful penalisation when construing an injunction carrying penal consequences. An injunction prohibiting mooring to land did not, in context, prohibit anchoring a vessel to the river bed without a physical connection to the land. A minor or technical breach will not ordinarily justify committal. Binding findings in a later decision may create an issue estoppel which the contempt court must respect.

The claimant local authority sought the committal of the defendant for alleged breaches of an interim injunction concerning the positioning and anchoring of his houseboat on the River Thames. The injunction had been granted on an interim trespass case and included a power of arrest.

Before the contempt hearing, a final injunction had been granted in separate proceedings on the basis of nuisance, while the alleged trespass had not been established. The claimant accepted that the relevant findings were binding by issue estoppel. The central issues were the proper construction of the interim injunction, whether the alleged breaches were proved to the criminal standard, and whether any breach warranted committal.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant proved only a short-lived breach on 18 July 2023, when the vessel was connected to trees or vegetation on the river bank. The other sample allegations were not proved.
2. A contempt application requires clear and unambiguous terms, proper notice, and proof of breach beyond reasonable doubt. The principle of doubtful penalisation applies when construing an injunction carrying penal consequences. A minor or technical breach will not ordinarily justify committal.
3. The interim injunction had to be construed in its factual and procedural context. Its references to mooring, gangplanks, scaffolding poles and ropes described methods of physically connecting the vessel to Richmond’s land. They did not prohibit anchoring to the river bed without such a connection. The words “situated near to” did not independently prohibit a vessel merely being near the river bank.
4. The later findings of HHJ Blair KC bound the court by issue estoppel. The contempt court could not act as an appellate court by reopening the findings that the vessel had not been materially moored to or trespassed on Richmond’s land.
5. The claimant’s challenge to the power of arrest was not necessary to the disposal, but the judge considered that section 27 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 was relevant to a local authority injunction and imposed a significant threshold. The claimant had not drawn that provision to the earlier judge’s attention.
6. Permission was not required under section 285(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to continue the contempt proceedings. The judge considered, without finally deciding the point, that permission may have been required before obtaining a substantial costs order against the bankrupt defendant.
7. The final nuisance injunction remained in force until midnight on 29 July 2028. Costs were reserved for further written argument.

The judgment was a first-instance determination of contempt proceedings. It records earlier injunction decisions in the same litigation but does not state any appeal history.