South Tees Development Corporation & Anor v PD Teesport Limited

An easement may be implied where it is necessary to give effect to the parties’ common intention as to a definite and particular use of land. The court must first construe the transaction and may imply a term only where the parties must have intended it, including where necessary for business efficacy or so obvious as to go without saying.

Prescription requires use as of right, meaning peaceable, open use without permission. Once open use is proved, the evidential burden may shift to the servient owner to establish permission. Mere acquiescence or inaction is insufficient.

Proprietary estoppel requires assurance, reasonable reliance and detriment. In commercial negotiations conducted on the basis that a formal agreement will follow, reliance will ordinarily be unreasonable.

The claimants sought negative declarations concerning rights of way over land forming part of the former British Steel site at Teesside. The defendant, the statutory harbour authority and owner of Teesport, counterclaimed for positive declarations concerning access to South Gare, Redcar Quay and South Bank.

The issues included express and implied grants, easements by prescription, statutory capacity to acquire easements, trespass by a roundabout, and proprietary estoppel arising from discussions about alternative access.

The third party had acquired part of the claimants’ land during the proceedings. The central questions were whether the defendant had established the claimed rights and whether the construction of the roundabout gave rise to an enforceable equity.

1. Statutory capacity. The Tees and Hartlepools Port Authority Act 1966 gave the port authority capacity to acquire easements. Sections 12 and 14, read with the statutory definition of land as including hereditaments, were sufficiently broad. The proposed defence based on lack of capacity was dismissed.
2. South Gare. The 1891 Deed created a general right of way benefiting South Gare. The 1925 Deed was ineffective to grant a right over land which the grantor did not own, and the doctrine of estoppel by deed did not assist because there was no clear and unequivocal representation of title. The 1974 Conveyance did not contain an implied grant over the remainder of the diverted route. The claim based on the deeds therefore failed.
3. Redcar Quay. A right of way was implied into the 1971 Conveyance. Road access was necessary for the ordinary use, maintenance and operation of the quay, even though the primary ore-handling system used conveyors and rail. The right was limited to use of the quay as a quay where road access was not generally required for the primary loading and unloading system.
4. Prescription. Use “as of right” is synonymous with nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Open and continuous use of Access Route 6 from 1974 established a prescriptive right for all purposes and vehicles. Use of Access Route 1 from 1953 until its blockage established a prescriptive right for general access and egress, excluding haulage, and a separate right for emergency access and egress when Tees Dock Road was impassable. The 1980 Licence did not cover the general use relied upon and did not interrupt prescription.
5. Other rights and trespass. The defendant established a subsisting express right over the former route in the Swan Hunter Conveyance and an express right from the Rhombus to Tees Dock Road under the 1964 Deed. Its claim under section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925 failed. The roundabout’s footpath trespassed on the defendant’s land, but the road did not.
6. Proprietary estoppel. Although an assurance of alternative emergency access was made, reliance was unreasonable in circumstances where the parties expected a formal agreement. The defendant also failed to prove detrimental reliance. The estoppel claim failed.

Declarations were to reflect the rights established. A further hearing was directed for the form of order, costs, permission to appeal and consequential matters.