Matrix Receivables Ltd v Musst Holdings Ltd

Consequential orders following a judgment concerning collateral use of disclosed documents, summary judgment, abuse of process, amendment and costs. A breach of the prohibition on collateral use does not automatically require striking out or another sanction. The court should consider practical effect, including whether there was specific prejudice or deployment, and make proportionate orders regulating future use.

On an unsuccessful summary judgment or strike-out application, the usual starting point remains that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs. That principle reflects both Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 44.2, and the symmetry that a successful applicant may generally recover the costs of ending the action. Departure requires a sufficient reason in the circumstances.

The judgment dealt with consequential matters arising from the court’s earlier decision in the same proceedings, reported at [2024] EWHC 1495 (Ch). The earlier judgment found a breach of the rule against collateral use of documents disclosed in separate proceedings, but no specific prejudice, deployment, deliberate or reckless breach, or cover-up.

The court was required to determine the form of a document-filleting exercise, the costs consequences of the collateral-use application, the costs of unsuccessful summary judgment and abuse-of-process applications, and the costs of an amendment which had been allowed. The central issues were how to make proportionate protective orders and whether the usual costs rule should be displaced.

1. Collateral use and filleting. The court ordered a proportionate three-stage process under rule 31.22 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Musst was to provide the public documents from the Musst v Astra proceedings. MRL was then to identify documents read or referred to in those proceedings, including documents reasonably inferred to have been read, and explain how non-retained documents would not be used. Musst was subsequently to identify Astra documents obtained through disclosure which it did not otherwise possess and which had not been read or referred to. A document-by-document list was unnecessary.
2. The earlier findings meant that the breach had no demonstrated practical effect. There was no specific prejudice or deployment, and the allegations did not justify striking out or another sanction. The appropriate response was regulation of future use and no order as to the costs of the collateral-use application. The filleting costs were to be costs in the case.
3. Summary judgment. MRL had entirely defeated Musst’s application concerning the contractual and restitutionary claims. The usual starting point under rule 44.2 was applicable. The restitutionary claim required factual determination, and the volume of material had contributed to the refusal of summary judgment. Sharp v Blank [2016] EWHC 776 (Ch) turned on its own facts, including mixed success, and did not justify a different order. Musst was therefore ordered to pay MRL’s costs of the summary judgment application on the standard basis.
4. Abuse of process. MRL had also entirely succeeded in resisting strike-out. Although the abuse argument remained open at trial, there was no reason to depart from the usual costs order. Indemnity costs were refused: the argument was weak, but the court was not prepared at that stage to find it obviously misconceived, and the costs were closely connected with the summary judgment application.
5. Amendment and final orders. MRL was to bear the costs of and occasioned by its amendment. The amendment application itself was treated as a case-management decision, with costs in the case. The summary judgment and abuse-of-process costs were payable by Musst to MRL, assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.

The judgment was a consequential first-instance judgment following the court’s earlier judgment in the same proceedings, [2024] EWHC 1495 (Ch). It determined the consequential orders and costs arising from that decision.