Stefanos Neophytou v The Governor Of HMP Berwyn & Anor

A prison governor’s power to refuse an application for early release on compassionate grounds depends on the basis of the application and the terms of the governing policy. For applications based on the prisoner’s health, the governor may refuse only where it is clear that the specified health criteria are not met. The governor must otherwise submit the application to the relevant Ministry of Justice casework section, even without supporting release.

The legal meaning of exceptional circumstances is not altered by the policy. Relevant matters may be considered cumulatively, but a condition is not exceptional merely because it causes individual suffering. The decision-maker may assess the evidence against knowledge of conditions in the wider prison population and available treatment. The claim was dismissed.

The claimant was detained under a ten-year default term activated after non-payment of a confiscation order. He applied for early release on compassionate grounds, relying principally on severe deterioration in PTSD symptoms and the asserted unsuitability of prison for the recommended treatment. His mother’s illness and family circumstances were relied on as matters exacerbating his condition and contributing cumulatively to the case.

The prison governor refused to submit the application to the Secretary of State’s casework section. The claimant sought judicial review, alleging procedural error, misinterpretation of the early-release policy, failure to engage with medical evidence, and failure to consider cumulative and family circumstances. The central issue was whether the governor lawfully exercised the delegated power to refuse a health-based application.

1. Claim dismissed. The governor’s decision was treated as a rationality challenge rather than a claim based on procedural unfairness.
2. The power to grant compassionate release under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 258, belongs to the Secretary of State. The policy distinguishes health-based applications from applications based on tragic family circumstances or other exceptional circumstances. Under paragraph 4.21, the governor may refuse a health-based application only where it is clear that the paragraph 4.17 or 4.18 criteria are not met. If those criteria are met, the application must be submitted to PPCS, whether or not the governor supports release.
3. The governor wrongly relied on paragraph 1.4(c) of the Policy. That provision concerns the same facts existing at sentencing, not merely the same diagnosis. A condition known at sentencing may subsequently worsen, and a default term activated for non-payment of a confiscation order is not equivalent to the criminal sentence previously imposed. The policy could have granted a wider delegated power, but it did not.
4. Nevertheless, the governor was entitled to conclude that the claimant’s condition was not exceptional. Exceptional circumstances must be assessed in the context of the wider prison population. The prevalence of mental illness in prison, the availability of treatment, and the claimant’s engagement with prison psychological services were relevant matters. The governor was not bound to accept the private experts’ view that treatment had to occur outside prison.
5. The court accepted that matters relied upon should in principle be considered singly and cumulatively, following R v Kelly. On the facts, however, the mother’s condition and family circumstances did not materially alter the health-based assessment. The governor’s reasoning, read as a whole, was not irrational.
6. Any procedural or legal error would in any event have led to the same outcome. Relief would therefore have been refused under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 31(2A), or in the court’s residual discretion.
7. The claimant’s application for anonymity was refused. Open justice extended to identification of the particular claimant and the case advanced by him. The names of his partner and child were redacted.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The claim challenging the governor’s refusal to submit the compassionate-release application to PPCS was dismissed.