Birmingham City Council v Victoria Adshead

In sentencing for contempt arising from breach of an anti-street-cruising injunction, the court should assess culpability and harm by reference to the guidance in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council, applied by analogy to street-cruising cases. Harm includes both harm actually caused and the risk of harm created. Deliberate racing and convoy driving at substantially excessive speeds on public roads may justify immediate custody even where actual harm is limited. Mitigation, including youth, good character, remorse and an early admission, may justify suspension of the custodial sentence. Maximum credit should be given for an admission made at the earliest opportunity following legal advice.

Birmingham City Council obtained an injunction prohibiting participation in street cruises within Birmingham. The injunction applied to persons unknown who participated or intended to participate in such cruises and had been served on the defendant, who accepted actual knowledge of it.

The defendant admitted driving in convoy and racing with another vehicle at speeds of up to approximately 70 miles per hour on a 40 mile per hour urban dual carriageway, including a section reduced to a single carriageway by roadworks. The issue was the appropriate sentence for the admitted contempt.

1. The defendant’s admissions and the video evidence established contempt beyond reasonable doubt. Her conduct involved racing, driving in convoy and excessive speed, creating danger to other road users, a risk of property damage and nuisance.
2. The court adopted the sentencing approach in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631. The Court of Appeal’s endorsement of applying that guidance by analogy in street-cruising cases in Birmingham City Council v Lloyd [2023] EWCA Civ 1355 supported that approach.
3. Culpability fell within Category B because the breach was deliberate but did not reach the level of a very serious or persistent serious breach. Harm fell within Category 2. Although actual harm was limited, the risk of serious harm from racing and convoy driving at speeds substantially above the limit placed the case at the upper end of that category.
4. The starting point was one month’s imprisonment, within a range from adjourned consideration to three months. There were no aggravating factors. The defendant’s youth, good character, first breach, remorse, intention to comply and early admission were significant mitigation. A fine or deferred consideration would nevertheless be inadequate, and custody was required.
5. The appropriate sentence before credit was 39 days’ imprisonment. Applying maximum one-third credit for the admission produced 26 days. The sentence was suspended for 12 months, conditional on compliance with the injunction in its current or any amended form.
6. Costs were summarily assessed at £2,174.30, payable by instalments of £250 per month, with the first payment due by 4.00 pm on 8 August 2024. The defendant had no civil legal aid costs protection under section 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.

This was a first-instance contempt sentencing decision. The judgment records that any appeal from the suspended order of committal lies to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) and must be filed within 21 days.