Queen Mary University of London v LSY & Ors

On a summary possession claim under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Part 55, the question is whether the claim is genuinely disputed on grounds that appear substantial. Students occupying university land for an unauthorised protest are trespassers where the university’s free-speech code requires permission for events on its premises. Potential difficulty in enforcing possession, or the availability of an injunction, does not prevent a possession order where the landowner is otherwise entitled to possession. Convention rights may be engaged, but possession is justified where it is prescribed by law, protects the landowner’s property rights and is proportionate. A university’s decision to terminate any licence and refuse retrospective authorisation will not be unlawful where it reasonably balances free speech, safety, disruption and the rights of the wider university community.

Queen Mary University of London sought possession of its Mile End campus from protesters occupying part of the campus in an encampment supporting Palestine. The claim was initially brought against persons unknown and later included identified protesters. Earlier proceedings were adjourned because a public-law challenge appeared arguable on the limited material then available.

The identified defendants later settled their claims with the University. The court therefore determined the outstanding possession claim against the remaining occupiers, while considering whether there was any real prospect of a defence based on property law, the University’s free-speech obligations, public law or rights under the ECHR.

1. Summary possession test. Under CPR 55.8(2), summary possession depends on whether the claim is genuinely disputed on grounds that appear substantial. This is equivalent to the summary-judgment test of a real prospect of success and no other compelling reason for trial: Global 100 Limited v Maria Laleva [2021] EWCA Civ 1835, [2022] 1 WLR 1046. Conflicts of evidence were assumed in the defendants’ favour unless documentary evidence made that outcome unrealistic.
2. Property law. The University was prima facie entitled to possession. Its general student licence did not authorise occupation for protest purposes because the University’s Code required permission for events on campus. The protesters therefore had no real prospect of establishing that they were not trespassers. Even if an implied licence had existed, it had been withdrawn by the University’s communications and service of proceedings.
3. The possible changeable status of students, depending on whether they were protesting or engaged in ordinary student activity, was not a reason to refuse possession. Enforcement difficulties were a future practical issue. A possession order could extend across the campus because the campus was substantively one piece of land and there was a real possibility that protest activity would spread.
4. ECHR rights and proportionality. Assuming in the protesters’ favour that Articles 9, 10 and 11 were engaged, possession was prescribed by law and pursued to protect the University’s property rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol. The measure was proportionate: the objective was important, possession was rationally connected to it, no less intrusive measure would restore the land, and the University’s property rights outweighed the attenuated weight of protest conducted by trespass on land regulated by the Code. Article 14 added nothing on the evidence.
5. Public law and statutory duties. The court did not need to determine the lawfulness of the University’s decisions because they had not been challenged and stood unless set aside. In any event, the decisions to terminate any licence, refuse retrospective permission and continue the possession claim had no real prospect of successful public-law challenge. The University reasonably considered safety, public order, disruption, free speech and the interests of the wider community. Its duties under the Education (No 2) Act 1986, the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, the Equality Act 2010 and the Human Rights Act 1998 were substantially reflected in the Code.
6. Disposition. There was no real prospect of a successful defence and no other compelling reason for trial. The court made the possession order, excluding parts of the campus subject to third-party leases.