Kazi Anis Ahmed & Ors v Ahsan Akbar

An interim injunction protecting private or confidential information requires a structured assessment. The court should first consider, under ordinary quia timet principles, whether there is a sufficiently real risk of threatened wrongdoing. It should then apply section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, asking whether the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed, with the balance between Articles 8 and 10 in view. A speculative injunction is impermissible.

Confidentiality turns centrally on unconscionability. The risk of further publication may be established cumulatively by threats, conduct intended to communicate a threat, links to prior dissemination, and serious damage to the defendant’s credibility.

The claimants sought continuation of an injunction granted without notice by Linden J. The injunction restrained misuse of private information concerning the claimants and their private correspondence. The claimants later amended their pleadings to include properly particularised misuse of confidential information.

The dispute arose from financial disagreements between the parties. The defendant had sent emails containing threats and had arranged for parcels containing financial documents to be sent to addresses associated with the claimants. He initially denied sending the parcels and later admitted that he had lied to the court. Evidence also linked him to information published, or intended for publication, on the gemconfiles.com website.

The central issues were whether the information was confidential, whether the relevant private information attracted a reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether there was an unacceptable risk of further publication justifying interim relief.

1. Rehearing. The court reheard the application because its earlier judgment had been based in part on uncertainty about who sent the parcels. Under AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] UKSC 16, the court had a wide discretion to alter its judgment before the order was perfected. The new evidence required the matter to be considered afresh.
2. Applicable framework. The court accepted a two-stage approach. First, the risk of threatened wrongdoing was assessed under broad quia timet principles, having regard to all relevant circumstances. Secondly, section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 required consideration of whether the claimants were likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. The exercise required an assessment of the balance between Articles 8 and 10. A speculative injunction could not be granted, and the defendant had to know with sufficient particularity what conduct was restrained. The formulation in Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] QB 103 was preferred to later reformulations.
3. Confidential and private information. The financial information was confidential because it concerned the claimants’ personal financial affairs and had not entered the public domain. The central question in a misuse of confidential information claim was whether the defendant’s state of mind made the proposed use unconscionable. The relevant private information also carried a good prospect of attracting a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly in the context of alleged blackmail.
4. Risk and outcome. The May and July emails contained threats of blackmail. The sending of the parcels was intended to be interpreted as a threat. The defendant’s connection with the website provided strong evidence of a real risk of publication, and his repeated lies materially undermined the reliability of his assurances. These matters, taken cumulatively, established an unacceptable risk of further publication. Further injunctive relief was therefore granted. The defendant’s later applications based on alleged changes in Bangladesh’s political situation were refused because they had no connection with the reasons for granting the injunction.