Robert Maccallum v The Secretary of State for Education

On an appeal under regulation 17 of the Teachers’ Disciplinary (England) Regulations 2012, the High Court reviews whether the Secretary of State’s decision was wrong. The court must show appropriate deference to specialist professional judgment and must not substitute its own view on the merits. The Secretary of State is bound by the panel’s factual findings about whether alleged wrongdoing occurred, but may attach greater seriousness or weight to proved misconduct when deciding sanction or the review period. The reasons must be read flexibly and as a whole. A decision may nevertheless be set aside if it is disproportionately harsh. A prohibition order and its review period are directed principally to safeguarding pupils, maintaining public confidence and upholding professional standards, rather than punishment.

The appellant appealed under regulation 17 against a decision made on behalf of the Secretary of State following a Teaching Regulation Agency professional conduct panel. The panel found proved that he had sexual intercourse with a vulnerable former pupil in 2019 and had acted dishonestly when questioned by the school Principal. It recommended a prohibition order with a two-year minimum period before review.

The decision-maker imposed the prohibition order but set a five-year minimum review period. The appellant argued that the decision relied on allegations and facts rejected or not found by the panel, failed to apply the relevant guidance, and was disproportionately harsh. The central issue was whether the five-year review period was wrong on an appeal proceeding by way of review.

1. Appeal dismissed. The five-year minimum period before an application to review the prohibition order was upheld.
2. The appeal proceeded by way of review under CPR 52.21. The court had to decide whether the decision was wrong, but could not substitute its own assessment of the merits merely because it would have reached a different conclusion. Appropriate deference was owed to the expertise of the panel and the Secretary of State. That deference was considerable, but was not identical to the Wednesbury standard: a decision could be wrong because it was disproportionately harsh.
3. The statutory scheme was bifurcated. The professional conduct panel determined whether allegations of misconduct were proved and made a recommendation on sanction. The Secretary of State was the final decision-maker on the prohibition order and review period. The Secretary of State could not find that an incident occurred when the panel had found it unproved, but could attach greater seriousness or weight to proved facts and could take a different evaluative view of risk.
4. The decision-maker’s reasons had to be read flexibly and as a whole. Matters already addressed when imposing the prohibition order did not need to be repeated mechanically when fixing the review period.
5. The Secretary of State was entitled to treat the proven 2019 misconduct in the context of the close relationship formed while the former pupil was at school, her vulnerability and dependency, and the appellant’s lack of insight. This did not contradict the panel’s finding that the earlier conduct had not amounted to misconduct, nor did it punish the appellant for unproved allegations.
6. The Guidance was non-exhaustive. The Secretary of State could regard the proven sexual misconduct, dishonesty, vulnerability, dependency and lack of insight as supporting a longer review period, even though the case was not treated as serious sexual misconduct requiring an irreducible lifetime prohibition. The review period served the public interest in safeguarding pupils and maintaining confidence in the profession. The appellant’s professional contribution was acknowledged but could properly receive less weight.

Not stated in the judgment.