Irving John Cleave & Anor v Mary Louise Cleave

A proprietary estoppel equity arises where a sufficiently clear assurance, reasonable reliance and substantial detriment make it unconscionable for the promisor to resile. The elements are not watertight compartments, and lifelong commitment to a family farm may constitute compelling detriment where it is causally connected to the assurance.

The remedy is directed to preventing or undoing unconscionability. Fulfilment of the promise is ordinarily the starting point, subject to proportionality, practicality, justice between the parties and the promisor’s need for continuing security. A trust may be constituted where the legal owner validly declares it and has a settled intention to transfer property into it, notwithstanding an ineffective transfer. Transactions supported by professional advice will not constitute undue influence, non est factum, duress or unconscionable bargain absent proof of the relevant elements.

The claimants, a son and daughter-in-law, sought relief concerning a family farm. The son claimed that he had worked for many years on the faith of assurances that he would inherit the farm. The claimants also sought declarations concerning a trust deed and a transfer of development land executed by the defendant, the son’s 91-year-old mother.

The defendant alleged defective attestation, undue influence, non est factum, duress and unconscionable bargain. She also disputed the proprietary estoppel claim and ownership of a vehicle. The central issues were whether an equity had arisen, whether the trust had been constituted despite the ineffective transfer, and what relief should be granted.

1. Proprietary estoppel. The court found that the defendant and her late husband had assured the first claimant from a young age that the farm would eventually be his, on the understanding that he remained and worked there. He had declined a significant alternative employment opportunity and devoted his working life to the farm for very low wages. That commitment was causally connected to the assurances and constituted substantial detriment. It would therefore be unconscionable for the defendant to resile from the promises.
2. The court applied the principles summarised in Davies v Davies and the remedial framework in Guest v Guest. The remedy must prevent or undo unconscionability, with proportionality at its centre. Fulfilment of the promise was the starting point. The proposed transfer of the barn and the intended trust arrangements were provisionally regarded as the fairest means of satisfying the equity, subject to further evidence about the defendant’s finances, care costs and taxation.
3. Trust. The trust deed was duly executed. Although the TP1 was ineffective because the defendant’s signature was not witnessed, the defendant was the legal owner, had validly declared the trust and had a settled intention to transfer the land into it. Applying T. Choitheram International S.A. v. Pagarani and Bowack v. Saxton, the trust was nevertheless properly constituted. The distinction between land and the assets considered in those authorities was immaterial.
4. Other challenges. The transactions were not explicable only by undue influence. The defendant understood the arrangements, had received professional advice and acted freely. There was no sufficient evidential basis for non est factum, duress or unconscionable bargain. The court also declared that the Ford Sierra Cosworth had passed to the first claimant by survivorship.
5. Final relief was reserved pending further disclosure and a supplemental judgment. Provisionally, the barn was to be transferred to the claimants, the defendant was to retain the farmhouse, orchard and paddock, and the remaining farmland was to pass to the first claimant on the defendant’s death, subject to appropriate arrangements for the defendant’s care and accommodation.

Not stated in the judgment.