London Borough of Havering v William Stokes & Ors

A precautionary injunction against persons unknown requires compelling justification. The claimant must show a strong probability of a future tort or breach of planning control, real and imminent harm, and that other remedies are inadequate. The order must include appropriate procedural, temporal and geographical safeguards.

Against a named defendant, the court must assess the evidence concerning that defendant separately. Previous commission of the threatened conduct is not essential. The court may draw common-sense inferences from association with others, but the inference depends on the nature, duration and circumstances of the association and the conduct involved.

Relief must be no wider than necessary. A power of arrest requires separate consideration of necessity and proportionality.

The claimant local authority sought final precautionary injunctions concerning unauthorised Traveller and Gypsy encampments, forcible entry and commercial fly-tipping. Relief was sought borough-wide against named defendants and in respect of 306 specified sites against persons unknown.

An interim injunction had been granted in 2019. The final hearing took place in October 2022, but judgment was deferred pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47. Further submissions and evidence were then received.

The central issues were whether the statutory and equitable conditions for precautionary injunctions were satisfied, how risk should be assessed for named defendants, whether relief against persons unknown was proportionate, and whether powers of arrest should be attached.

1. Persons unknown. Applying Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47, the claimant established a compelling need for protection against a real and imminent risk of breaches of planning control, trespass and private nuisance. Damages and the powers under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 were inadequate to address repeated and widespread incursions. The injunction was therefore granted for the identified sites. Its geographical and temporal limits, the Stopping Policy and liberty to apply provided proportionate safeguards for affected Convention rights.
2. Named defendants. The court adopted the two-stage approach summarised in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2108] EWHC 2456 (Ch): whether there was a strong possibility of future infringement and whether the anticipated harm would be sufficiently grave and irreparable for damages and later relief to be inadequate. Each defendant had to be assessed individually. A defendant need not previously have committed the threatened act. Past conduct, association with others and the circumstances of the relevant encampments could support an inference of future risk, assessed by common sense and ordinary rationality.
3. The relevant factors included the number and nature of encampments, forced entry, substantial or commercial fly-tipping, the size of the group, the defendant’s degree of association and whether the conduct was repeated. Presence at an encampment alone did not automatically establish responsibility for wrongdoing, but it could indicate willingness to associate with or engage in harmful conduct in the particular circumstances.
4. The presence of a vehicle of which a defendant was the registered keeper was sufficient, absent rebuttal, to support an inference that the defendant was present at the encampment. Insurance to drive a vehicle, without more, was insufficient.
5. The injunction was granted against all continuing named defendants except the specified defendants against whom service or sufficient risk had not been established. A borough-wide order was justified for some defendants and site-specific protection for others. A power of arrest was refused generally, because the predominant risks concerned financial interests and amenity, but was granted for Brian and Patrick Stokes because the relevant incident involved marked violence and serious property damage.
6. The order was to continue until 19 October 2025, with its form to be refined to distinguish the restrictions applying to persons unknown, borough-wide defendants and site-specific defendants.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.