Cameron Marshall v Bath and North East Somerset Council

On an appeal from a valuation tribunal, the High Court considers questions of law rather than conducting a rehearing on the facts. A person’s “sole or main residence” is determined objectively by asking what a reasonable onlooker, aware of the material facts, would regard as the person’s home at the relevant time. Time spent at a property is important but not determinative.

The statutory meaning of “resident” in section 6(5) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 applies to Class N of the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992. Class N therefore requires the relevant student to have his sole or main residence at the dwelling where reliance is placed on paragraph 1(a). Class N paragraph 1(b) concerns term-time accommodation used for studying and attending the course.

The appellant, a student and joint leaseholder of a dwelling in Bath, appealed under regulation 43 of the Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Regulations 2009 against the Tribunal’s dismissal of his council tax exemption claim.

He claimed Class N exemption for the period during which he said he occupied the dwelling, and Class K exemption for the period after he returned to London. The Tribunal found that the Bath property was not his sole or main residence and dismissed the appeal. The central issues were whether Class N had properly been raised, whether the sole or main residence test applied to it, and whether the Tribunal’s factual assessment involved an error of law.

1. Scope of appeal. Class N was properly before the Tribunal. Although the appellant initially referred expressly to Class K, the facts advanced also indicated a claim for Class N, and the respondent addressed that claim without objection. The relevant issues were therefore Class N for the occupation period and Class K thereafter.
2. Class K. Class K could not apply after 3 January 2023 because the qualifying persons liable as owners under section 6(2)(f) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 were not all students.
3. Sole or main residence. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Williams v Horsham District Council, [2004] EWCA Civ 39, clarified that “sole or main residence” refers to premises in which the taxpayer actually resides. Ordinarily, the main residence is the dwelling that a reasonable onlooker, knowing the material facts, would regard as the person’s home at the material time. Earlier authorities remain relevant because the assessment is fact-sensitive. Duration of occupation and absence are relevant but cannot be treated as determinative.
4. Class N. The statutory definition of “resident” in section 6(5) applies to the 1992 Order. Class N paragraph 1(a) therefore requires sole or main residence, although a person may have more than one residence. Paragraph 1(b) concerns accommodation used by students during term for the purpose of studying and attending their courses. The appellant’s evidence did not establish that the Bath property was term-time accommodation in that sense.
5. Evidence and appellate restraint. The Tribunal was not required to accept unchallenged assertions that the property was the appellant’s main residence. The fairness principle discussed in TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths, [2023] UKSC 48, applies in a proportionate and flexible manner in Tribunal appeals, but it does not place the Tribunal in a straitjacket. The Tribunal considered the evidence and did not misdirect itself.
6. Disposition. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the Bath property was not the appellant’s main residence during the relevant period. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal from the Valuation Tribunal for England dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision of 19 April 2024 was upheld.