Paul Evans v Bridgend County Borough Council

Section 70A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 permits an authority to decline a later application only where the development and land are the same or substantially the same as those in the earlier application. Separate applications should be considered separately where that is practically possible. An authority cannot treat them as one merely because they concern adjoining parts of a site, have consecutive numbering, or lack a coherent planning justification for their separation.

The power is not a planning equivalent of summary judgment. It cannot be used because an officer considers an application hopeless or because its planning merits appear weak. Where material differences may affect the reasons for refusal, the applications must be determined on their own merits.

The claimant applied for outline planning permission for nine dwellings on each of two parcels forming part of a larger green site. The defendant declined to determine both applications under section 70A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, relying on an earlier refused and dismissed application for 15 dwellings across the whole site.

The claims were consolidated. Permission was granted on the issue whether it was irrational for the authority to regard each new application as the same or substantially the same development on the same or substantially the same land, particularly because the two applications were treated together as an attempt to circumvent section 70A.

1. Decision. The claims succeeded on the permitted ground. The decisions declining to determine the two applications were quashed, and the authority was required to determine the applications. The claim for damages or financial compensation was rejected. Costs were left for further directions.
2. Separate consideration of applications. The authority’s reasons for treating the applications together did not establish that it was impracticable to consider them separately. The location of a vehicular drop-off point, consecutive numbering of dwellings, the absence of a coherent planning reason for subdivision, and the alleged failure to address earlier objections did not bear on that practicability or justify treating the applications as one.
3. Similarity under section 70A. Each 2023 application concerned nine dwellings on approximately half of the site, whereas the earlier application concerned 15 dwellings across the whole site. The applications therefore could not rationally be regarded as substantially the same. The authority had impermissibly assessed the planning merits of the new applications, including their car-free nature, instead of focusing on statutory similarity and the claimant’s intention in making repeated applications.
4. The court followed the principle in R (Harrison) v Richmond-upon-Thames LBC that section 70A is not a power to dismiss an application because an officer regards it as hopeless. Whether the differences affected the earlier reasons for refusal required detailed consideration by the authority on the merits.
5. The high threshold for irrationality was met. It was not highly likely that the authority would have reached the same decision had it acted lawfully. The court gave no indication as to the eventual planning merits.